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ABSTRACT
The digital era invoked new challenges to judicial systems. The
Internet enabled violation of privacy and intellectual property rights and
enhanced the magnitude of criminal activity. Recognizing the inability of
courts to handle a high magnitude of lawsuits, along with enforcement
difficulties, policymakers worldwide chose to delegate quasi-judicial
powers to online intermediaries that facilitate or enable such potential
violations or infringements of rights. Search engines were first tasked to
perform a quasi-judicial role under a notice-and-takedown regime to
combat copyright infringement around the world. Recently, the European
Union (EU) decided to delegate judicial authority to search engines by
granting rights of erasure, or delisting of personal data, about EU
individuals under certain circumstances. Effectively, the EU placed
search engines—mainly Google currently—as a judiciary, tasked to
balance different fundamental human rights. This privatization of the
judiciary represents a new paradigm in legal systems and possesses vast
global ramifications, which must be further scrutinized.
This Article provides such scrutiny. It begins by briefly exploring
the rights to be forgotten and delisted. It then provides an overview of the
quasi-judicial roles played by search engines prior to the new EU rights
regime and compares them to their new judicial role. Following an
examination of the pragmatic and normative difficulties in the
implementation of the EU rights regime, this Article evaluates and
discusses the future of the private judiciary. It examines the drawbacks
and benefits of judicial privatization; explores whether other means of
regulation are more appropriate; and proposes modest solutions to
properly address the shortcomings of the new privatized judiciary. This
Article warns against such form of privatization and its current
implementation, especially when fundamental rights are at stake. If
policymakers insist on adjudicating search engines, they must also
restrain their judicial power and provide adequate safeguards for society
in the form of transparency and proper oversight on both their removal
procedure and decisions.
INTRODUCTION
Digital technology invoked many new challenges to judicial
systems. The Internet, along with its benefits, created a space in which
individuals could misuse and violate rights. It made it easier to violate
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privacy laws, infringe intellectual property rights, and commit crimes.
Due mainly to financial, enforcement, and other technical difficulties,
many policymakers worldwide chose to delegate quasi-judicial powers to
online intermediaries that facilitate or enable such potential violations or
infringements of rights. To a great extent, it makes sense. The state was
unable to deal with the enormous number of potential violations that the
Internet facilitates and thereby created a preliminary process for
examination of the violation of such rights, while granting a right to
appeal intermediaries’ decisions to judicial authorities. Under such a
mechanism, online intermediaries allegedly play merely a quasi-judicial
role as a preliminary process before the judicial process. However, this
Article shows that assumption is not always true.
Online intermediaries—perhaps, mostly search engines—make
decisions on content based on two factors: internal policy and regulation.
Filtering search results based on internal policy does not generally
categorize search engines as a judiciary. As long as search engines
comply with the law, as private companies, they are entitled to decide
how to construct their services. Regulation does not also necessarily
imply that search engines act as a judiciary. While search engines are
subject to regulation regarding their search results, e.g., removing links
to illegal content from a search query, they do not generally replace the
role of courts. But along the way, search engines were tasked with
making decisions on content removal, which changed their role from a
preliminary decider to a quasi-judicial entity, and, most recently, in the
European Union as a judiciary that effectively replaces courts.
The move to intermediaries acting as quasi-judicial entities began
in 1998 in the United States under the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA)1 and continued via other forms of regulation worldwide.2
These forms of regulation created a notice-and-takedown regime to
combat copyright infringement in which search engines receive requests
from copyright owners or their representatives to remove search results
that link to allegedly infringing materials.3 Directly, the DMCA tasked
search engines with making decisions on intellectual property rights, but
indirectly, it also enabled them to decide on fundamental rights like free
speech. Mostly, it triggered a potential paradigm shift: private entities
that operated online could be delegated with judicial power and
obligations previously reserved for courts. But such a judicial role is
limited to a great extent. While fundamental rights are indirectly
involved in the process, such claims revolve mostly around economic
1. See infra note 88.
2. See infra note 89.
3. See infra Part II.A.
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interests; these rights have more adequate safeguards that rely on
oversight and transparency and generally comply with the rule of law.
The EU has recently taken the privatization of the judiciary a step
further by adopting a right of erasure (right to be forgotten) under the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).4 It is a “right of individuals
to have their data no longer processed and deleted when they are no
longer needed for legitimate purposes.”5 Prior to its adoption, and until
the GDPR takes effect after a two-year transition period, the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) granted EU individuals a more limited right to be
delisted under an interpretation of the Data Protection Directive (DPD).6
On May 13, 2014, the ECJ held that Google, and more broadly, search
engine operators, are responsible for the processing of personal data that
appears on web pages published by third parties. Practically, it means
that search engines that operate in the EU are obliged to “delist” any
material that is inadequate, irrelevant, no longer relevant, or excessive in
relation to those purposes and in the light of the time that has elapsed,7 as
balanced against the public’s right to the information.8 In other words,
under the current EU regime, search engines are obliged, under some
circumstances, to remove search queries related to the search of a
specific name.
Under the right to be delisted, search engines are tasked with a
judicial role. They are obliged by the ECJ to decide which content will
appear or disappear when someone uses a specific search query related to
his or her name. If we once referred to search engines as gatekeepers of
information,9 they have now taken it upon themselves, or rather, have
been ordered to undertake a new judicial task of balancing between legal
and fundamental rights: privacy and data protection on the one hand, and
freedom of speech, freedom of information, and freedom of the press on
the other. Such a move delegates judicial power to search engines, which

4. See infra note 29.
5. A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection in the European Union, infra note
29.
6. Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on
the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter EU Data Protection Directive].
7. See Case C–131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD),
2014 EUR-Lex CELEX 62012CJ0131 (May 13, 2014) [hereinafter Google Spain].
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Virtual Gatekeepers and the Right
to Exclude Indexing, 26 DAYTON L. REV. 179 (2001); Urs Gasser, Regulating Search Engines:
Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 201 (2006); Eric Goldman, Search Engine
Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 188 (2006).
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now operate as a judiciary in the digital world.10 Their employees are the
new digital judges, and they now act as a courthouse.
The judicial-like roles of search engines under the right to be
delisted enhances and expands the roles of intermediaries in the digital
era. It constitutes a form of privatization: For-profit, commercial
entities—not the state—are placed as the judiciary to decide on
fundamental rights. Indeed, privatization of governmental roles is not
new in either the digital or kinetic worlds. States sometimes privatize
some portion of the executive and the legislature by granting authorities
a prerogative to regulate, allowing private forms of enforcement, and
even hiring private militaries.11 To some extent, even judicial roles are
privatized, mainly through Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
procedures12 or a unique procedure commonly referred to as
“rent-a-judge,” in which parties commission retired judges to make
binding adjudications.13 But in terms of judiciary privatization, the right
to be delisted takes two steps forward: It authorizes and obligates
for-profit commercial entities to balance between fundamental rights and
liberties with almost no oversight or transparency. Furthermore, it
impacts the rights of many people that are not parties to the dispute.
What are the ramifications of this form of privatization? Can
for-profit organizations serve as adequate judges on fundamental rights
and liberties? What are the benefits and drawbacks of such an approach
to human rights and the rule of law? This Article provides a normative
evaluation of and strives to enrich the discussion on privatization, the
roles of the judiciary in a democratic society, and the future of the
Internet under the right to be forgotten and the right to be delisted.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I explores the rights that are
invoked in the new judiciary—the right to be forgotten and the right to
be delisted under the ECJ ruling. Part II provides an overview of judicial
roles played by online search engines prior to the right to be delisted and
compares them to the new judicial role that they play under it. Part III
scrutinizes the judicial difficulties in the implementation of the right to
10. Edward Lee argued that under the right to be forgotten, Google is “functioning similar to
how a government agency or administrative body might act.” Edward Lee, Recognizing Rights in
Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU Right to Be Forgotten, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1017, 1024
(2016). This Article argues further that search engines’ role in the right to be delisted (which will be
further differentiated from the right to be forgotten) resembles judicial decisions made by courts.
11. See infra Part III.B.
12. For more on ADR of Internet-related disputes, see Jacques de Werra, ADR in Cyberspace:
The Need to Adopt Global Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms for Addressing the
Challenges of Massive Online Micro-Justice, SWISS REV. INT’L & EUROPEAN L. (forthcoming,
2016) (discussing the potential of ADR mechanisms for solving Internet-related disputes in which
online platforms are challenged by a massive amount of removal requests).
13. See infra note 184.
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be delisted under the new courthouse from both pragmatic and normative
aspects. Part IV evaluates and discusses the future of the private
judiciary. It examines the drawbacks and benefits of judicial
privatization; discusses whether other means of regulation are more
appropriate; and proposes modest solutions to properly address the
shortcomings of the new judiciary. Finally, Part V argues that when
dealing with fundamental rights, the privatization of the judiciary is
dangerous to both the rule of law and to the existence of a democratic
society. If any country insists on using search engines as a judiciary, it
must draw the contours of its judicial power and provide adequate
safeguards for society.
I. THE RIGHTS TO BE FORGOTTEN AND DELISTED
The availability of information has dramatically increased in the
digital age. Once information is posted online, it could forever orbit the
digital atmosphere.14 Unlike the limited capacity of the human mind to
remember everything, the e-memory revolution could enable a never
forgetting Internet.15 Every picture of us posted, comment made, or video
uploaded remains there for others to see. Anything that has been openly
written about us could be accessible at all times by almost anyone with
access to the Internet. Search engines make this information easily
accessible to the public.
Although it would appear optimal to live in an ever-knowing
society with endless access to information and potential for knowledge, it
will hardly be utopian. The Internet works well for those individuals who
can obtain information on anyone without ever meeting him or her. In
that way, we can fulfill our voyeuristic needs and use it, for example, to
pre-screen potential dates, pre-screen candidates for jobs, or even learn
more about our neighbors and people living elsewhere. By the same
14. See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 50–91 (2009) (arguing that digital technology and storage have led to the demise of
forgetting). However, it would be false to assume that the Internet never forgets. Information
persistence research, a field of research dedicated to measuring how long information remains
accessible and unchanged, suggests otherwise. Various studies on content availability found that
most online content is not available after one year. See, e.g., Junghoo Cho & Hector Garcia-Molina,
The Evolution of the Web and Implications for an Incremental Crawler, in PROC. OF THE 6TH INT’L
CONF. ON VERY LARGE DATA BASES 200–09 (2000); Dennis Fetterly, Mark Manasse, Marc Najork
& Janet L. Wiener, A Large-Scale Study of the Evolution of Web Pages, 34 SOFTWARE PRAC. &
EXPERIENCE 213, 213–37 (2004). However, along with technological advancement in various fields,
e.g., storage capabilities, this might also change in the near future. For a summary of information
persistence research and conclusions, see Meg Leta Ambrose, It’s About Time: Privacy, Information
Life Cycles, and the Right to Be Forgotten, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 369, 372–73, 389 (2013).
15. For a general overview and discussion of the e-memory revolution, see GORDON BELL &
JIM GEMMELL, TOTAL RECALL (2009).
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token, everyone else could be harmed. The fact that online information
cannot be removed for almost any reason16 is not necessarily good.
Constantly being under a magnifying glass could prove to be harmful for
our social opportunities. For example, a picture of a teenager drinking at
a party could affect her career opportunities for the rest of her natural
born life.17 Should technological advancements imply that we lost our
ability to have or regain anonymity?18 Could the Internet lead to a
“Reputation Bankruptcy”?19
The concept of digital oblivion is intriguing.20 The digital age
clearly possesses potential negative ramifications for humankind, which
should not be completely waived under the auspices of freedom of
speech and freedom of information. Digital technology allows for
unprecedented amounts of data collection and retention, which could be
harmful for our existence.21 However, as many scholars argue, regulation
in the form of both the right to be delisted and the right to be forgotten
could endanger freedom of speech, freedom of information, and freedom
of press.22 It raises concerns of censorship and presents many challenges
to the framers of such rights. But what perhaps is more intriguing, and
rarely discussed under the right to be delisted, is the reshaping of roles of
search engines.23
But before we delve deep into the right to be forgotten and the ECJ
ruling on the right to be delisted, we need to briefly understand their
origins. It all goes back to Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis who

16. Both information and links to information could be removed under limited circumstance,
depending on the type of information and the jurisdiction. See infra Part IIA.
17. Here are two examples of how online information negatively affected employment of
individuals. Kimberley Swann, a sixteen-year-old British employee (at that time) at Ivell Marketing
& Logistics, was fired for moaning on Facebook, “I’m so totally bored!!.” Stacy Snyder posted a
photo on her Myspace account showing her at a party wearing a pirate hat and drinking from a
plastic cup along with the caption “Drunken Pirate.” She was fired for promoting drinking in view of
her under-age students. Andrew Levy, Teenage Office Worker Sacked for Moaning on Facebook
About
Her
‘Totally
Boring’
Job,
DAILY
MAIL
(Feb.
26,
2009),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1155971/Teenage-office-worker-sacked-moaningFacebook-totally-boring-job.html; Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES
(July
21,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacyt2.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
18. Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 P.2d 34, 41 (Cal. 1971) (“[J]ust as the risk of
exposure is a concomitant of urban life, so too is the expectation of anonymity regained.”).
19. JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 228–29 (2008).
20. See generally MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, supra note 14.
21. See Meg L. Ambrose & Jef Ausloos, The Right to Be Forgotten Across the Pond, 3 J. INFO.
POL’Y 1, 3 (2013).
22. See infra note 143.
23. For a brief history of the roles of search engines in the Internet, see, for example, Jonathan
Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 254 (2006).
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articulated the need for a “right to be let alone.”24 They gave birth to the
right to privacy. Since then, various forms of privacy rights have
appeared with different levels of legal protections.25 Over time, and
mainly after the emergence of digital technologies, the right to privacy
seemed insufficient to cover many new aspects of our lives. For example,
it did not sufficiently protect the interests of individuals to control
information posted online that relates to them. Individuals were in need
of new legal mechanisms to control the vast amount of information
posted online. They were in need of a legal right that would enable them
to decide what personal information may be posted online or available
via search engines. This gave birth to a new privacy right,26 the so-called
“right to be forgotten.”27
A. Right to Be Forgotten (Erasure)
The right to be forgotten originates from the French and Italian
“right of oblivion”—le droit à l’oubli and diritto al’ oblio,
respectively—which censors the facts of an ex-criminal’s conviction and

24. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193
(1890).
25. The right to privacy is protected differently around the world. Under United States law, for
example, while the word “privacy” does not appear in the Constitution, certain aspects of the right to
privacy are protected by various amendments to the Constitution, and perhaps mainly, by the Fourth
Amendment. Other than the Constitution, privacy in the United States is protected by various federal
and state laws, such as the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–277,
112 Stat. 2681–728 (1998). The EU—aside from privacy protection in each Member State’s
constitutions and laws—protects privacy under, inter alia, Article 8 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which provides the protection of “the right
to respect for [an individual’s] private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”
(Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221); and by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, article 7
(protects respect for private and family life) and article 8 (mentioning the protection of personal
data). See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 18 December 2000,
O.J. C 364/1–22.
26. Few scholars argue that the right to be forgotten should not be treated as a privacy right,
but rather as a different kind of human right. See, e.g., Napoleon Xanthoulis, The Right to Oblivion
in the Information Age: A Human-Rights Based Approach, 10 U.S.–CHINA L. REV. 84, 98 (2013)
(“It is clear that ‘oblivion’ has proven, under certain circumstances, to be a necessity for
safeguarding human well-being. A right to oblivion confirms the need for a paradigm shift in
privacy, leading to a multidimensional conceptualization of the right to privacy.”).
27. The OECD also recognized in 2013 that “more extensive and innovative uses of personal
data bring greater economic and social benefits, but also increase privacy risks.” See ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), OECD GUIDELINES OF THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY
TRANSBORDER
FLOWS
OF
PERSONAL
DATA
ch.
1,
11
(1980),
AND
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecd-privacy-guidelines.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7F89VHUF].
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incarceration and is designed to allow rehabilitation.28 In the context of
online privacy, the right to be forgotten (articulated also as the right of
erasure) made its debut in the EU as part of the GDPR.29 Proposed by
Viviane Reding, the European Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental
Rights, and Citizenship,30 the right to be forgotten enables a data subject
(an individual) to “obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data
concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have
the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay.”31
Such erasure should occur based on one of the following grounds:
first, the data is no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which
it was collected or otherwise processed;32 second, the data subject
withdraws consent on which the processing is based and where there is
no other legal ground for the processing of the data;33 third, the data
subject objects to the processing of personal data and there are no
overriding legitimate grounds for the processing,34 or where
personal data are processed for direct marketing purposes and the data
subject objects to the processing of his data;35 fourth, the data has been
unlawfully processed;36 fifth, the data has to be erased for
28. Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 88 (2012). A more
limited description of the right to be forgotten before the passage of the GDPR appeared in Eldar
Haber, The Cyber Civil War, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 41, 63–67 (2015).
29. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation),
2016 (Apr. 27, 2016) [hereinafter GDPR]. Alex Türk, the French data privacy commissioner, was
actually first to endorse the creation of a “right to oblivion.” Türk proposed forming an international
body, which would evaluate removal requests on a case-by-case basis. See Jeffrey Rosen, The
Deciders: Facebook, Google, and the Future of Privacy and Free Speech, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
1525, 1533 (2012). Prior to the GDPR, the right to be forgotten was discussed in a communication of
the EU in 2010. See A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection in the European
Union, at 8, COM (2010) 609 final (Nov. 4, 2010).
30. Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the European Comm’n, EU Justice Commissioner, The
EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the Standard Setter for Modern Data Protection
Rules in the Digital Age (Jan. 22, 2012). See generally Rosen, supra note 28 (exploring the right to
be forgotten proposal in the EU).
31. GDPR, supra note 29, at art. 17. This article will mainly refer to the latest version of the
GDPR from April 2016. The GDPR defines personal data as:
Any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an
identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in
particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location
data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological,
genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.
Id. at art. 4(1).
32. Id. at art. 17(1)(a).
33. See, e.g., id. at art. 6(1)(a), 9(2)(a). Id. at art. 17(1)(b).
34. Pursuant to article 21(1). Id. at art. 17(1)(c).
35. Pursuant to article 21(2). Id.
36. Id. at art. 17(1)(d).
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compliance with a legal obligation under EU or Member State law to
which the controller is subject;37 and finally, the collection and/or
processing of personal data belongs to a child below the age of sixteen.38
When the GDPR comes into force in early 2018, the EU will grant
its citizens and residents a right to delete information from the Internet39
upon meeting these criteria. The GDPR sets five exceptions.40 First, for
exercising the rights of freedom of expression and information;41 second,
for compliance with a legal obligation which requires processing of
personal data under EU or Member State law to which the controller is
subject, for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest, or
in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; third, for
reasons of public interest in the area of public health;42 fourth, for
archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research
purposes, or statistical purposes;43 and finally, for the establishment,
exercise, or defense of legal claims.44
The GDPR applies to “data controllers” that “determine the
purposes and means” of processing personal data. Who are those data
controllers?45 Beyond search engines, it is currently unclear. Will hosting
platforms like Facebook have erasure obligations under the GDPR? Only
time will tell. Whoever will be subject to erasure obligations, violation of
the right to be forgotten under the GDPR could lead to administrative
fines up to 20,000,000 EUR, or in the case of an undertaking, up to 4%
of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year,
whichever is higher.46 Unlike EU Directives, the GDPR is self-executing:

37. Id. at art. 17(1)(e).
38. Depending on the law of the EU Member State, but not below thirteen years old. Id. at art.
8(1), 17(1)(f).
39. While the right to be forgotten is often referred to as a right, it could also be characterized
as an ethical or social value, or as a virtue or policy aim. See Bert-Jaap Koops, Forgetting
Footprints, Shunning Shadows. A Critical Analysis of the “Right to Be Forgotten” in Big Data
Practice, 8 SCRIPTED 229, 231 (2011).
40. See GDPR, supra note 29, at art. 17(3).
41. In accordance with Article 80. Id. at art. 80.
42. In accordance with Article 9(2)(h), (hb) as well as Article 9(4). See id. at art. 17(3)(c).
43. Id. at art. 17(3)(d).
44. Id. at art. 17(3)(e).
45. Under the latest version of the GDPR, data controllers means,
The natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or
jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data;
where the purposes and means of processing are determined by Union law or Member
State law, the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination may be designated by
Union law or by Member State law.
Id. at art. 4(5).
46. Id. at art. 83(5).
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when it comes into force, it will be enforceable as law in all Member
States.47
The GDPR was approved in the EU and will soon grant EU
citizens and residents the lengthily debated right to be forgotten or right
of erasure. But, the future of such right and how it will be implemented
in the EU is still highly unclear. What is clear is that the EU recognizes a
more limited right, which applies to delisting results from search engines
upon meeting specific criteria.
B. Right to be Delisted
A more limited right to be forgotten exists in the EU under national
data protection laws, as set by the DPD.48 The DPD forms a right to
access data and conditions the blocking of it. Under the DPD, Member
States must guarantee that every data subject has the right to obtain from
the controller49 “the rectification, erasure or blocking of data, when the
data processing is not in compliance with the Directive and particularly
in instances where the data are ‘incomplete or inaccurate.’”50 Article 6
ensures that personal data must be: (1) processed fairly and lawfully; (2)
collected for specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes, in addition to
historical, statistical, or scientific purposes;51 (3) adequate, relevant, and
not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected
and/or further processed; (4) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to
date;52 and (5) kept in a form that permits identification of data subjects
for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data were
collected or for which they are further processed.53
The DPD set the grounds for a right to be delisted. Unlike the
current interpretation of the GDPR, content is not deleted, but rather
delisted from some search results under certain circumstances. While this
47. See Regulations, Directives and Other Acts, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/eu-law/decisionmaking/legal-acts/index_en.htm [https://perma.cc/679X-H3TM].
48. See EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 6.
49. “Controller” under the EU Data Protection Directive means,
[T]he natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or
jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data;
where the purposes and means of processing are determined by national or Community
laws or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination may be
designated by national or Community law.
Id. at art. 2.
50. Id. at art. 12.
51. Provided that Member States provide appropriate safeguards. Id. at art. 6.
52. Every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data that are inaccurate or incomplete,
having regard to the purposes for which they were collected or for which they are further processed,
are erased or rectified. Id. at art. 6.
53. Personal data stored for longer periods should be stored for historical, statistical, or
scientific use. Id. at art. 6.
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Directive has existed since 1995, it was only recently that the ECJ
revived such right in the digital environment, granting EU citizens and
residents54 an ability to better control information listed in search
engines’ results.
Prior to any normative evaluations of such right, we need to go
back to the story behind the ECJ ruling. Back in 1998, Mario Costeja
González’s house was repossessed and put up for auction for the
recovery of social security debts.55 Under an order of the Spanish
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, La Vanguardia Ediciones SL (La
Vanguardia) published such information in its newspaper, both online
and offline.56 Since then, when someone Googled Mr. González’s name,
two links to La Vanguardia’s article, from January and March 1998,
would appear. Dissatisfied with Google’s results, on March 5, 2010, Mr.
González lodged a complaint with the Spanish Data Protection Agency
(Agencia Española de Protección de Datos or AEPD) against La
Vanguardia, Google Spain, and Google Inc.57
González requested that La Vanguardia remove or alter those pages
so that the personal data relating to him no longer appeared. González
also requested that Google remove or conceal the personal data relating
to him so that they cease to be included in the search results and no
longer appeared in links to La Vanguardia. The reason for such requests,
according to González, was that the context of the attachment
proceedings concerning him was now entirely irrelevant as it had been
resolved for a number of years.58
Under the decision of the AEPD, Google was labeled a data
controller,59 responsible for removing search results regarding the
plaintiff.60 Google appealed to Spain’s national high court (Audiencia
54. Under the Working Party guidelines, a data subject is a citizen or resident of an EU
Member State. See Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Guidelines on the Implementation of the
Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment on “Google Spain and Inc. v. Agencia Espanola
de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja Gonzalez” C-131/12, 8, WP 225, 1, 3 (Nov. 26,
2014), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/
files/2014/wp225_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/ALD2-NZ9M] [hereinafter Working Party].
55. Google Spain, supra note 7, ¶ 14.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. ¶ 15.
59. Under Section 2(d) of the EU Data Protection Directive which defines controller as:
[T]he natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or
jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data;
where the purposes and means of processing are determined by national or Community
laws or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination may be designated by national or Community law . . . .
EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 6, at art. 2(d).
60. See Google Spain, supra note 7, ¶¶ 17, 33, 41. Specifically in this case, the AEPD ruled
that La Vanguardia’s posting was lawful, as “it took place upon order of the Ministry of Labour and
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Nacional), which asked the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the right to
be delisted under the DPD. The ECJ held that search engine operators are
responsible for their processing of personal data that appears on web
pages published by third parties. Under the ECJ ruling, processing of
personal data and the free movement of such data are interpreted as
“processing of personal data” within the meaning of the DPD when the
information contains personal data, and search engines61 are “data
controllers”62 with respect to that processing. Thus, search engines must
exclude results “where they appear to be inadequate, irrelevant or no
longer relevant, or excessive in relation to those purposes and in the light
of the time that has elapsed”63 while they should be “fair[ly] balance[ed]”
against the public’s right to the information.64 EU citizens and residents
are entitled to ask search engines to remove the links, and search
engines—Google in this case—are obliged to remove links to web pages
that are linked to a search of their name. The exceptions include
“particular reasons, such as the role played by the data subject in public
life, . . . justified by the preponderant interest of the general public in
having . . . access to the information” when such a search is made.65
Though limited to some extent, the ECJ ruling sets the grounds for
a narrow version of a “right to be forgotten,” which places liability on
search engines.66 But such right to be delisted is much narrower in its
scope. For example, it currently applies only to search engines.67 No

Social Affairs and was intended to give maximum publicity to the auction in order to secure as many
bidders as possible.” Id. ¶ 16.
61. The scope of the decision, while currently limited to search engines, could expand to other
intermediaries “whenever the conditions established in the ruling are met.” See Working Party,
supra note 53, at 8.
62. While the ECJ sought the opinion of Advocate General Niilo Jääskinen, which opined that
Google should not be considered as a “controller” of the personal data appearing on web pages it
processes, the ECJ concluded that “It is the search engine operator which determines the purposes
and means of that activity and thus of the processing of personal data that it itself carries out within
the framework of that activity and which must, consequently, be regarded as the ‘controller’ in
respect of that processing pursuant to Article 2(d).” See Google Spain, supra note 7, ¶ 33. For the
opinion of Advocate General Niilo Jääskinen, see Case C-131/12, Opinion of Advocate General
Jääskinen, 25 June 2013. It should be noted that prior to the ECJ ruling on the right to be delisted,
the working party opined that search engines are not “primary controllers.” See Working Party,
supra note 53, at 14.
63. See Google Spain, supra note 7, ¶ 93 (emphasis added).
64. Id. ¶ 81.
65. Id. ¶ 97.
66. As noted by the ECJ: “it should be pointed out that the processing of personal data carried
out in the context of the activity of a search engine can be distinguished from and is additional to
that carried out by publishers of websites, consisting in loading those data on an internet
page.” Id. ¶ 35.
67. Cf. supra note 61.
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other intermediary is currently considered a data controller.68 Mainly,
online content is not deleted, only links for search queries upon searching
an individual’s name are deleted. Other links to that information will
continue to exist, and perhaps more importantly, the content itself will
not be deleted.
Much has happened since the ECJ ruling. Search engines like
Google, Yahoo!, and Bing built online mechanisms to exercise a right to
be delisted mostly under EU domains.69 Not long after, requests began to
flow in.70 Obligated by the ECJ ruling, and, subsequently, by local data
protection laws which implemented the DPD, search engines had to
quickly form an evaluation process to comply with the large number of
requests sent.71
The right to be delisted could have global ramifications.72 One of
the main drawbacks of the right to be delisted is its effect on the role of
68. However, the Working Party noted in guidelines that “[t]he ruling is specifically addressed
to generalist search engines, but that does not mean that it cannot be applied to other intermediaries.
The rights may be exercised whenever the conditions established in the ruling are met.” See Working
Party, supra note 53, at 17.
69. It should be noted that Google currently choses to apply the right to be delisted not only on
the twenty-eight Member States of the EU but also on the EFTA states (Iceland, Liechtenstein,
Norway, and Switzerland). See Alastair Jamieson & Emma Ong, Google Opens Privacy Web Form
for
‘Right
To
Be
Forgotten’
Requests,
NBC
NEWS
(May
30,
2014),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/google-opens-privacy-web-form-right-be-forgotten-requestsn118211 [https://perma.cc/57AP-U7KX]. In addition, the right to be delisted may also expand
beyond the EU, as it has at the beginning of 2016 in Russia. See infra note 254. Also, beyond
disparities between the right to be forgotten and the right to be delisted, even after over two years
since the ECJ ruling, much ambiguity exists in the territorial aspect of the right. While search
engines currently treat the decision of the ECJ as limited to EU domains, the territorial scope of the
judgment is still unclear. It is mainly unclear whether the individual’s nationality or residence
matters. Some commentators argued that “there would be no impediment under EU law, for
example, to a Chinese citizen in China who uses a US-based Internet search engine with a subsidiary
in the EU asserting the right to be forgotten against the EU subsidiary with regard to results
generated by the search engine.” See Christopher Kuner, The Right to be Forgotten and the Global
Reach of EU Data Protection Law, CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 1, 2014),
http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2014/06/the-right-to-be-forgotten-and-the-global-reach-ofeu-data-protection-law.html [https://perma.cc/NLL8-9X8B].
70. While data on removal requests are rather limited, I analyze some statistical findings in Part
IV.B.
71. See infra Part II.B.
72. The right to be delisted should not be treated as in a vacuum, i.e., that it only effects a
portion of the world. Mainly, the right to be delisted could expand to include domains beyond the
EU, such as Google.com. See infra note 145. In addition, the right to be delisted will also highly
effect the U.S.–EU Safe Harbor Agreement as long as the agreement exists. Under this agreement,
the EU enables the exporting of personal data from its domain only when U.S.-based privacy
policies
are
adequate.
See
U.S.–EU
Safe
Harbor
Overview,
EXPORT,
https://build.export.gov/main/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018476 (last updated Dec. 18, 2013)
[https://perma.cc/2UNX-28JQ]. For a similar argument, see Michael L. Rustad & Sanna Kulevska,
Reconceptualizing the Right to Be Forgotten to Enable Transatlantic Data Flow, 28 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 349, 386–87 (2015).
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the judiciary. The ECJ effectively endowed search engines with the
power to decide which links will remain online and which will not; it
gave search engines the power to decide which fundamental rights
prevail: privacy and data protection or freedom of speech, freedom of
information, and freedom of the press. Essentially, search engines have
become judges that adjudicate fundamental rights and liberties.
II. THE NEW JUDICIARY IN THE DIGITAL WORLD
Prior to the emergence of the right to be delisted, and depending on
the legal system in question, controlling the flow of information online
was mostly limited to intellectual property restrictions, defamation
claims, contractual obligations, and privacy torts.73 The new right to be
delisted, which tasked search engines to deal with a new type of claim,
must be balanced against other fundamental rights before exercised.
Effectively, the ECJ shifted enforcement and adjudication to for-profit
commercial entities, which are not necessarily equipped or accountable
to make such decisions. On the normative side, this move could lead to a
paradigmatic shift in jurisprudence, transferring the traditional function
of adjudication from public officials to private entities.74
Such judiciary privatization raises both pragmatic and normative
difficulties that should be scrutinized. But prior to such evaluation, we
first need to understand to what extent the ECJ ruling changed the roles
of search engines. Is this indeed a new judicial role? What current legal
obligations and practices apply to search engines that could also be
labeled as adjudicative? How is such right different from current removal
practices of search engines? In order to answer such questions, Part II.A
will summarize and evaluate the judicial roles that search engines have
played thus far in the digital world, mainly focusing on Google.75

73. See Leta Ambrose, supra note 14, at 375. See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop Others from
Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000).
74. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 235, 235 (1979) (reviewing the traditional roles of courts).
75. While various search engines currently exist, Google has unrivalled dominance in the
search engine sector, with the most significant market share (as of October 2015, 89.2% of the
global market), and therefore in many times will be used in this article as a key-example of search
engines. For updated statistics on search engines’ market share, see Worldwide Market Share of
Leading
Search
Engines
from
January
2010
to
October
2015,
STATISTA,
http://www.statista.com/statistics/216573/worldwide-market-share-of-search-engines (last visited
Jan. 17, 2016) [https://perma.cc/64Y7-UGSU].
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A. Quasi-Judicial Roles of Search Engines
The role that search engines play in the digital environment is
debatable.76 Google’s announced search philosophy is that “[s]earch
should reflect the whole web.”77 In practice, this philosophy hardly
matches their actions. Search engines are not always neutral to content.78
Google commonly filters search results.79 Their algorithm, known as
PageRank,80 is a combination of regulation and internal policies.81 The
algorithm of each search engine decides, inter alia, which results will
appear or not appear and how they will be ranked. As long as search
engines comply with their legal obligations, they can construct the
algorithm in any manner they desire. Thus, Google makes decisions on
content depending on two factors: regulation and its own policy.
The first part is regulation. Even prior to the right to be delisted,
and well beyond the European borders, search engines like Google were
subject to regulation regarding their search results. Such regulation
obviously depends on different legal systems and jurisdictions, but can
be generally divided into three categories: sensitive information,
copyrighted materials, and governmental requests.
Under the legal category of sensitive information, Google will
generally remove links to content that includes child sexual abuse
imagery.82 But Google is also subjected to domestic laws, which obligate
76. Some scholars opine that search engines should play a role of a neutral conduit, while
others opine that they play a role of an active and opinionated editor. Whether search engines like
Google should be treated as a “conduit” or an “editor,” and thereby could be subject to speech
regulation, extends beyond the scope of this article. For an overview and analysis of such views, see
James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868 (2014).
77.
See
“Revenge
Porn”
and
Search,
GOOGLE
PUB.
POL’Y
BLOG,
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.co.il/2015/06/revenge-porn-and-search.html
[https://perma.cc/
ZUP6-Y9UM].
78. Google decides on our freedom to access information. Google can place anyone
down-the-list, in a manner which the information is inaccessible de facto. For a discussion on
whether search engines are neutral, see James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law,
93 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2007); Uta Kohl, Google: The Rise and Rise of Online Intermediaries in the
Governance of the Internet and Beyond (Part 2), 21 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 187, 190–97 (2013);
Goldman, supra note 9.
79. See generally Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1115 (2005).
80. Google Fun Facts, INTERNET ARCHIVE (Apr. 24, 2009), http://web.archive.org/
web/20090424093934/http://www.google.com/press/funfacts.html [https://perma.cc/BAV8-2KTG].
81. Regulation of search engines experienced a respectable amount of academic discussion
much prior to the emergence of the right to be forgotten and the right to be delisted. For examples of
such scholarship, see Lucas Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Shaping the Web: Why the Politics of
Search Engines Matters, 16 INFO. SOC’Y 169 (2000); Frank Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and
Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 115 (2006); Elkin-Koren, supra note 9; Gasser, supra note 9;
Goldman, supra note 9; Grimmelmann, supra note 78.
82. See Removal Policies, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/2744324
(last visited Jan. 20, 2016) [https://perma.cc/5LRL-QJSZ].
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it to remove search results in other instances as well.83 For example,
under the German and French versions of Google, it is forbidden to
include sites containing extremist content, inter alia, featuring hate
speech and Holocaust denial.84 Pornography is blocked in many
countries, especially child pornography.85 Google Thailand filters sites
and videos which might “Lése-majesté,” i.e., insult Thailand’s King.86 In
EU Member States, under the obligation of the directive of electronic
commerce, search engines are obliged to remove defamatory materials
upon notice.87
Search engines also receive requests to remove links to websites
that presumably infringe copyright, set under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA)88 in the United States and the Electronic

83. For a full overview of regulatory requirements on search engines, see Kohl, supra note 78.
84. See Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Statement of Issues and Call for Data,
HARVARD (Oct. 26, 2002), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/google [https://perma.cc/BY3YH9R4]; Letter from Peter Fleischer of Google to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, Chair, Article 29 Working Party, at 3, (July 31, 2014), https://docs.google.com/a/kentlaw.iit.edu/file/d/
0B8syaai6SSfiT0EwRUFyOENqR3M/preview [https://perma.cc/Y943-DFU2] [hereinafter Letter
from Peter Fleischer]. However, upon a relevant search, Google indicates the number of excluded
results and refers to Lumen (previously known as Chilling Effects) for further explanation. For more
on Lumen, see infra note 107.
85. Andy Greenberg, Where Google Still Censors, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2010),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0208/outfront-technology-china-where-google-stillcensors.html; Danny Friedmann, Paradoxes, Google and China: How Censorship Can Harm and
Intellectual Property Can Harness Innovation, in EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO LEGAL ASPECTS OF
KNOWLEDGE-ECONOMY BUSINESS MODELS 303, 307 (Aurelio Lopez-Tarruella ed., 2012).
86. Greenberg, supra note 84; Friedmann, supra note 84, at 307.
87. See Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC) art. 12–14. The UK inserted such
provision prior to the introduction of the E-Commerce Directive. See Defamation Act 1952, 15 & 16
Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 66, § 1(1) (Eng.) (amended by Defamation Act of 1996); Kohl, supra note 78,
at 198.
88. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA), codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 512,
1201–1205, 1301–1332; 28 U.S.C. § 4001 (2012). Under the DMCA, a service provider will not be
held liable for monetary relief, for injunctive or other equitable relief, or for infringement of
copyright by reason of the provider’s transmitting, routing, or providing connections for material
through a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, or by reason of the
intermediate and transient storage of that material in the course of such transmitting, routing, or
providing connections, if the transmission of the material was initiated by or at the direction of a
person other than the service provider; the transmission, routing, provision of connections, or storage
is carried out through an automatic technical process without selection of the material by the service
provider; the service provider does not select the recipients of the material except as an automatic
response to the request of another person; no copy of the material made by the service provider in
the course of such intermediate or transient storage is maintained on the system or network in a
manner ordinarily accessible to anyone other than anticipated recipients, and no such copy is
maintained on the system or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to such anticipated recipients
for a longer period than is reasonably necessary for the transmission, routing, or provision of
connections; and the material is transmitted through the system or network without modification of
its content. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012); Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Technology Visible: Liability of
Internet Service Providers for Peer-to-Peer Traffic, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 15, 16 (2006).
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Commerce Directive in the EU.89 Under this “notice-and-takedown”
regime to combat copyright infringement, search engines (and other
online intermediaries) receive requests from copyright owners or their
representatives to remove search results that link to such allegedly
infringing materials.90 Under the U.S. version of notice-and-takedown,
intermediaries must respond “expeditiously” to notices of infringement
by removing or disabling access to allegedly infringing material when
certain conditions are met.91 Other hosting services—not search
engines—must promptly notify the subscriber that it has removed or
disabled access to the material and forward any counter notices from
alleged infringers back to the original complainant.92 If a lawsuit has not
been filed after ten to fourteen days following receipt of the counter
notice, the intermediary reinstates the contested material.93 In exchange
for compliance, search engines receive a safe harbor from liability for
Internet users’ acts of copyright infringement and for any mistaken
removal of materials done in good faith.94
The last form of regulation, operates under “governmental
requests.” Search engines like Google regularly receive requests from
courts and government agencies around the world to remove links to
content.95 As national security plays a role in many of these requests,
much secrecy lies within this form of adjudication. But Google does
provide a few examples. For example, in 2014 Google received a request
from Roscomnadzor, a federal executive body in Russia, to remove a
Blogger blog post discussing jihad in Russia’s North Caucasus region.96
The second part is policy.97 Beyond their legal obligations, search
engines make decisions. These decisions vary among search engines.
Google sometimes enables the removal of various types of personal
information: contact information (such as an email address or a
username); nonconsensual personal pictures which are sexually explicit;
89. See Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC), supra note 87 at art. 14.
90. In January 2016, in only one-month period, Google received 72,784,574 URLs requests to
be removed for alleged copyright infringement. For statistical data on such removal requests in
Google, see Transparency Report, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/
removals/copyright/?hl=en [https://perma.cc/HM6J-4ZWP].
91. 17 U.S.C §§ 512(b)(2)(E)(i)–(ii), 512(c)(1)(C) (2012). In addition, the DMCA requires
intermediaries to adopt and reasonably implement a policy to terminate the accounts of repeat
infringers and must notify users of this plan, while also accommodate “standard technical measures”
used by copyright owners to identify infringing material. See id. §§ 512(a)–(b), (d), (c), (i).
92. Id. §§ 512(g)(2)(A)–(B).
93. Id. § 512(d).
94. Id. §§ 512(c)(1)(A)–(B), (g)(1).
95. See Transparency Report, supra note 90.
96. Id.
97. For an empirical study of Google removal of content policy, see generally Jane R.
Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Vanished, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 137 (2013).
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government-issued ID numbers; a bank account or credit card number; a
pornographic site that contains a full name or business name; and images
of handwritten signatures.98 Under its advertising policy, Google does
not allow “the promotion of some products or services that cause
damage, harm, or injury.”99 It sometimes delists socially relevant content
that could harm autonomy, reputation, and emotional well-being, under
some circumstances.100 Google also offers a “SafeSearch” feature, which
offers to block inappropriate or explicit images from Google’s Search
results.101 Recently, Google decided to add “revenge porn” to its
potential delisting possibilities for search results worldwide.102
It is evident that search engines, like Google, already make
judgments regarding content in their services. Many of these judgments
should not be confused with judgments of a judiciary; compliance with
internal policies is not judicial in nature. Other parts of the process are
largely judicial in nature. Perhaps mainly, governmental requests and
copyright infringement claims mandated by some regulators could be
viewed as placing search engines and other intermediaries in a judicial
role.103 After all, they must make decisions on matters that relate to legal
rights.
The notice-and-takedown regime has many flaws that are beyond
the scope of this Article. In terms of judicial aspects, the decisions that
intermediaries make under this regime are judicial in nature. They do not
merely decide on an economic controversy but also affect fundamental

98. Remove Information from Google, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/websearch/
troubleshooter/3111061#ts=2889054%2C2889099 [https://perma.cc/A3BT-VRMQ].
99. Google provides examples of such products and services that they consider to be
dangerous: explosives; guns & parts; dangerous knives; other weapons (any other product that is
designed to (in modern-day usage) injure an opponent in sport, self-defense, or combat); recreational
drugs & drug-related equipment; and tobacco products & related equipment. Advertising Policies
Help, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/adwordspolicy/answer/6014299?hl=en [https://perma.cc/
DD7Q-6RW5].
100. Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Google Acknowledges, Revenge Porn Will Remain
Available on Websites, but Delisting It from Search Engines Can Make Information Harder to
Access, GUARDIAN (June 25, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/25/googlesrevenge-porn-opens-right-forgotten-us [https://perma.cc/M3ML-Q349].
101. Turn SafeSearch On or Off, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/websearch/
answer/510?hl=en [https://perma.cc/HEN6-UK45].
102. Joanna Walters, Google to Exclude ‘Revenge Porn’ from Internet Searches, GUARDIAN
(June 21, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/20/google-excludes-revengeporn-internet-searches [https://perma.cc/744D-4Z25].
103. Cf. Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or Chilling Effects - Takedown
Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 639 (2006) (arguing that notice-and-takedown under the DMCA “constitutes
an extrajudicial temporary restraining order”).

134

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 40:115

rights like free speech.104 Many of the intermediaries use automated
processes, which could pose even greater dangers to these rights.105
Among others, this quasi-judicial process raises concerns of transparency
and accountability.106
However, such a judicial role is much more limited in scope than
the right to be delisted. Transparency exists, to some extent, when
hosting services notify subscribers that they have removed or disabled
access to materials. There are also projects, like Lumen (previously
known as Chilling Effects), that enhance transparency by collecting and
publishing cease-and-desist notices from a variety of sources, including
all notices received by Google.107 Most importantly, both sides, and
usually even other interested parties, are granted an ability to take this
controversy to court. Thus, in terms of privatization, search engines (and
other intermediaries) under the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown regime
should be generally labeled as quasi-judicial entities.
B. The New Judicial Role of Search Engines
To understand the judicial role that search engines play under the
right to be delisted, we need to review the process. It begins with an EU
citizen or resident, characterized as a data subject, who, upon discovering
that his fundamental rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter have
been infringed upon, is entitled to approach the search engine with an
online removal request.108 These requests, which usually occur through a
web form,109 must clarify why a URL in the search engine’s results is
104. See, e.g., Theresa A. Lyons, Scientology or Censorship: You Decide, an Examination of
the Church of Scientology, Its Recent Battles with Individual Internet Users and Service Providers,
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and the Implications for Free Speech on the Web, 2 RUTGERS
J.L. & RELIGION 1, 1 (2000).
105. For a general analysis of intermediaries’ use of algorithmic enforcement under the
DMCA, see Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Enforcement:
Lessons from Copyright Enforcement by Online Intermediaries, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
106. For a general overview of transparency and accountability under the DMCA and
intermediaries use of algorithmic enforcement, see id.
107. See generally LUMEN, https://lumendatabase.org [https://perma.cc/5MFP-GWSC].
108. The Working Party did not specify which specific mechanisms search engines should
implement, but indicated that “online procedures and electronic forms, may have advantages and
would be advisable because of its convenience.” See Working Party, supra note 53, at 7. Google
does not generally provide an alternative process for submitting a removal request (e.g., by fax,
letter, and email). However, it does note that if a requester insists on not using the web form, Google
will process his or her request. See Letter from Peter Fleischer, supra note 83, at 7.
109. This is how Google removal process currently works: first, the data subject is required to
select the country (currently out of thirty-three states) whose law applies to his request. Then, the
data subject provides the name used to search, which he wishes to delist, and provides his full name,
even if making the request on behalf of someone else who he is authorized to represent, and contact
email address. The data subject then must provide the URLs for the web pages that the result links
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irrelevant, outdated, or otherwise inappropriate.110 At this point, the
search engine is required to examine whether the data subject has the
abovementioned right and whether his right overrides their economic
interest and the interest of the general public in having access to that
information upon conducting a search relating to his name.111
While the ECJ did not specify what constitutes interests of the
general public, it provided some criteria for examining requests: the
nature or sensitivity of the information; public interest; the role played by
the data subject in public life;112 and the time elapsed.113 While not
obliged by the court, search engines will usually notify the website that
the link was removed, but the website generally cannot object to a search
engine’s decision.114 If the search engine decides to decline the removal
request, after providing sufficient information on the grounds of the
refusal,115 the data subject can request that a “supervisory authority,”116
which in most cases will be the local data protection authority (DPA),
review the decision.117 They can also file an appeal to the relevant
judicial authority.118 Otherwise, the search engine will remove the
requested URLs from a list displayed following a search made on the
to. For each URL, the data subject is required to explain how the linked URL relates to him and why
the inclusion of that URL in search results is irrelevant, outdated, or otherwise objectionable. The
data subject is then required to attach a legible copy of a document that verifies his identity (or the
identity of the person whom he is authorized to represent). Finally, the data subject or his
representative signs the form by typing his full name and providing the date of the request. See
Search Removal Request Under Data Protection Law in Europe, GOOGLE,
https://support.google.com/legal/contact/lr_eudpa?product=websearch
[https://perma.cc/9B5NL29U]. Yahoo!’s process also begins with filling in a form and uploading a document verifying the
identity of the requester. In making the decision, Yahoo! is “taking into consideration numerous
factors, including the number, nature and complexity of the requests we receive.” See Requests to
Block Search Results in Yahoo Search: Resource for European Residents, YAHOO!,
https://uk.help.yahoo.com/kb/SLN24378.html [https://perma.cc/YK9N-AESJ].
110. See for example, in Google, where the removal request also demands, inter alia, a copy of
a valid form of photo ID, personal details, and links associated that you want removed. Search
Removal Request Under Data Protection Law in Europe, supra note 108.
111. Google Spain, supra note 7.
112. Id. ¶ 81.
113. Id. ¶ 93.
114. For an example of how Google exercised the right to be delisted on six articles published
on the Guardian website, see James Ball, EU’s Right to Be Forgotten: Guardian Articles Have Been
Hidden by Google, GUARDIAN (July 2, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/
jul/02/eu-right-to-be-forgotten-guardian-google [https://perma.cc/76KD-M7LZ]
115. See Working Party, supra note 53, at 7.
116. Google Spain, supra note 7, ¶ 77.
117. Id. ¶ 77. Frequently Asked Questions, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/faq/?hl=en#how_does_googles_process [https://perma.
cc/CAE4-ZGKA]. Any formal claims should be envisaged by Article 28(4) of the Directive and
treated by DPAs under their national legislation in the same manner as all other claims for
mediation. See EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 6; Working Party, supra note 53, at 11.
118. Google Spain, supra note 7, ¶ 77.
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basis of the data subject’s name. In some instances, the search engine,
upon displaying name-based queries that were affected by the decision,
will place a notification at the bottom of the search results indicating that
results may have been removed.119
We can learn from the experience of Google about how such
judicial processes works. As mentioned, the removal process necessitates
human intervention. Every removal request must be thoroughly
examined by a human examiner before making a decision.120 Google, for
example, has formed a team of specially trained reviewers who use
“dedicated escalation paths to senior staff and attorneys at Google to
adjudicate on difficult and challenging cases.”121 While, in most cases, a
single examiner is sufficient for deciding on a request, in some instances
there would be multiple examiners for a single request.122
How do examiners review removal requests? Put differently: How
does the Google courthouse operate? Two months after the ECJ ruling
Google appointed an advisory council to aid in the determination of
removal requests.123 This advisory council consisted of experts, mostly
external to Google, who reached out to the public for input.124 Over time,
Google has carefully developed criteria125 in partial alignment with
Article 29 of the Working Party’s guidelines (Working Party).126
119. See Letter from Peter Fleischer, supra note 83, at 10 (“With regards to the CJEU decision,
our current approach is to show a notification at the bottom of all search result pages for queries
where a name-based removal has occurred as well as for all other search result pages that appear to
be for the name of a person, indicating that results may have been removed.”). The main exception,
according to Mr. Fleischer, are “celebrities and other public figures,” which, according to Fleischer,
“are very rarely affected by a removal, due to the role played by these persons in public life.”
However, it should be noted that such practice is unlikely to continue in the EU, as it might
jeopardize the rationales behind the right to be delisted. Id.
120. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 116; Letter from Peter Fleischer, supra note
84, at 7 (“We are not automating decisions about these [right to be delisted] removals. We have to
weigh each request individually on its merits, and that is done by people.”).
121. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 116.
122. As of November 1, 2015, just over 30% of requests had been escalated for a second
opinion. See id.
123. See Natasha Lomas, Google Seeks to Shape Public Debate on Europe’s Right to Be
Forgotten Ruling, TECHCRUNCH (July 11, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/07/11/google-agitatesfor-public-debate-on-europes-right-to-be-forgotten-ruling [https://perma.cc/G9UT-7CWK].
124. See Google Advisory Council, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/advisorycouncil
[https://perma.cc/S7SH-5WFZ]. In January 2015, Google’s Council published its findings and
recommendations in a report. LUCIANO FLORIDI, ET. AL, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO
GOOGLE ON THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN, https://buermeyer.de/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/
Report-of-the-Advisory-Committee-to-Google-on-the-Right-to-be-Forgotten.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5PV2-2PCU].
125. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 116.
126. EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 6, art. 29; The Working Party consists of “a
representative of the supervisory authority or authorities designated by each Member State and of a
representative of the authority or authorities established for the Community institutions and bodies,
and of a representative of the Commission.” See id. at art. 29(2); Working Party, supra note 53.
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The process of evaluation consists of four stages.127 First, the
“examiner” determines whether the request contains necessary
information for Google to reach a decision. In cases where an individual
files a request that does not contain sufficient information for Google to
make a decision, the examiner would ask for supplementary information
to support the evaluation.128 Second, Google examines whether the
person making the request has a connection to a European country, such
as residency or citizenship.129 It verifies identity by requiring personal
documents such as driver’s licenses or national ID cards.130 Third,
Google examines the pages that appear in search results for the
requester’s name and ascertains whether the requester’s name appears on
the page(s) requested for delisting.131 Finally, Google decides whether the
page requested for removal includes information that is inadequate,
irrelevant, no longer relevant, or excessive (in relation to the purposes of
the processing at issue) based on the information that the requester
provides and whether there is a public interest in such information.132
Thus, Google becomes the judge and jury with respect to the right
to be delisted.133 Arguably, Google only plays the role of a preliminary
decider before individuals take their cases either to the court or to the
local DPA. However, as this Article further argues, from a legal realism
point of view, Google serves as a de facto court due mainly to two
factors: the inability to challenge approved requests and the practice of
appeal for rejected ones.
The first reason Google serves as a de facto court is the inability to
challenge approved requests. The process generally resembles an ex
parte procedure, meaning that not all parties to the controversy are
present.134 If Google approves a request, there is no appeal, as the only
127. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 116.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Such requirement is placed to verify identity, as Google has told media outlets it “often
receives fraudulent removal requests from people impersonating others, trying to harm competitors,
or improperly seeking to suppress legal information.” Caitlin Dewey, Want to Remove our Personal
Search Results from Google? Here’s How the Request Form Works, WASH. POST (May 30, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2014/05/30/want-to-remove-your-personalsearch-results-from-google-heres-how-the-request-form-works [https://perma.cc/LMA3-3FPA].
131. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 116.
132. Id.
133. Ann Cavoukian & Christopher Wolf, Sorry, but There’s No Online “Right to Be
Forgotten”, NAT’L POST (June 25, 2014), http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/anncavoukian-and-christopher-wolf-sorry-but-theres-no-online-right-to-be-forgotten [https://perma.cc/
KA4X-LSNF] (“The European Court of Justice has mandated that the Googles of the world serve as
judge and jury of what legal information is in the public interest, and what information needs to be
suppressed because the facts are now dated and the subject is a private person.”).
134. See Lee, supra note 10, at 45.
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interested party who is aware of the process is the requester who received
her wish to be delisted. Under this process, other interested parties,
including the publisher of the content, interested members of society, and
practically every person that uses the search engine, cannot appeal.
Therefore, Google does not play the role of a preliminary administrative
authority, but rather that of a secret judiciary.
Next we have the practice of appeal for rejected requests. One
example is Italy. Up until December 2, 2015, the total number of
“delisting” requests to Google Italy was 27,478.135 The number of URLs
which were requested for removal was 89,693.136 Google rejected to
remove 70% of such URLs (51,877).137 In more than a year and a half,
how many of these cases were taken to the Italian DPA?
Sixty.138 We can see similar outcomes in other DPAs,139 and while statistics of court filings are not widely available, they are likely to be even
lower than DPA requests.140 The number of appeals appears to be low for
individuals who are trying to preserve their rights.141 But some caution
should be taken here, prior to making any normative claims. While the
number of appeals to DPAs is currently low, this practice could change
over time, as the right to be delisted is fairly new. More importantly, it is
difficult to assess how many URLs were requested for removal by each
individual who appealed. While highly unlikely, the sixty appeals to the
Italian DPA could represent all the rejected URLs. All in all, with these
caveats in mind, it seems that pragmatically, even if search engines like
135. See European Privacy Requests for Search Removals, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/
transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/?hl=en [https://perma.cc/WRM5-75WU].
136. Id.
137. Unfortunately, Google does not currently publish the percentage of rejected requests,
which may include multiple URLs. See id.
138. The Italian DPA resolved fifty complaints (and approved one-third) while ten complaints
were still being examined at that time. See Rocco Panetta, Right to Be Forgotten: The Italian DPA
Has Resolved 50 Complaints After the Known Google Spain Decision, NCTM (Dec. 2, 2015),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a799812c-4961-42cd-aefd-191070af41e3
[https://perma.cc/Q97Q-RBFL].
139. Take Spain as another example. As of October 8, 2015, the Spanish data protection
agency has received 325 requests, which represent 1.7% of the Spanish data subjects that received a
rejection. Most member states DPAs received less than one hundred requests so far, and in five
member states DPAs received less than ten. See Peter Teffer, Europeans Give Google Final Say on
‘Right to be Forgotten’, EUOBSERVER (Oct. 8, 2015), https://euobserver.com/investigations/130590
[https://perma.cc/4J7B-CF6X].
140. For a similar argument, see Lee, supra note 10, at 22 (“The low rate of appeals of
Google’s rejections to national DPAs thus far suggests that the rate of lawsuits in court will be even
lower.”).
141. Traditionally in the United States, for example, approximately fifteen percent of
state-court civil cases are appealed. See THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 212979, APPEALS FROM GENERAL CIVIL TRIALS IN 46 LARGE COUNTIES,
2001–2005, at 2 (2006), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/agctlc05.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GQP76UT].
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Google are potentially just a preliminary filter for removal requests, it is
effectively the definitive authority, or the “courthouse,” that decides on
the right to be delisted.142
How is the right to be delisted different from the judicial roles that
search engines already play online? In many aspects. Practices, like the
notice-and-takedown of copyright infringement claims, are commenced
under procedural safeguards such as oversight and transparency. Surely,
such oversight and transparency are also limited under copyright
infringement claims, but these elements are ensured to be resolved to a
greater degree than under the right to be delisted. But mainly, prior to the
right to be delisted, search engines dealt primarily with various
applications of private law. They mostly decided on intellectual property
or torts. But under the right to be delisted, search engines are placed in a
position of a public court—deciding and balancing between fundamental
human rights and liberties. While not justifying any judicial
responsibilities placed on search engines, the latter has more profound
ramifications to democracy and the rule of law.
III. THE JUDICIAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE NEW COURTHOUSE
The rights to be forgotten and delisted have many benefits and
drawbacks.143 This Article focuses on the impact of the right to be
delisted on the roles of intermediaries in the digital environment. It
places search engines in a new role of guardians of human rights and
liberties without proper transparency and oversight. This new judicial
role raises both pragmatic and normative difficulties, which should be
thoroughly scrutinized. Such scrutiny will show that these difficulties
suggest against the right to be delisted in its current form. It will lead to a
discussion on how to delineate a more appropriate method of ensuring
privacy and protection of personal data, while keeping freedom of
information, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press and without
undermining the roles of the judicial system under the rule of law.

142. See Teffer, supra note 139 (arguing that currently, EU citizens generally accept Google as
the definitive authority in terms of the right to be forgotten [delisted]).
143. The benefits and drawbacks of the rights to be forgotten and delisted were scrutinized by
many scholars and journalists, especially after the ECJ ruling. For examples of such academic
research, see Ravi Antani, The Resistance of Memory: Could the European Union’s Right to Be
Forgotten Exist in the United States?, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1173 (2015); Craig A. Newman, ‘A
Right to Be Forgotten’ Ruling Will Cost Europe, WASH. POST (May 27, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-right-to-be-forgotten-will-cost-europe/2014/05/26/
93bb0e8c-e131-11e3-9743-bb9b59cde7b9_story.html [https://perma.cc/3A92-7JZF]; Jeffrey Toobin,
The Solace of Oblivion, NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2014/09/29/solace-oblivion [https://perma.cc/C7X3-34Y4]; Ambrose, supra note 14;
Haber, supra note 28, at 67–76.
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A. The Pragmatic Aspect
From a pragmatic aspect, the right to be delisted is problematic for
several reasons.144 Consider the territorial component as an example of
how the ECJ ruling is not necessarily applicable. Removal requests
currently extend only to a specific European domain, meaning that
search results will still be available through other EU domains and,
obviously, non-EU domains such as “.com.”145 If Europeans know that
their search results are being manipulated, it will be fairly easy for them
to bypass such manipulation. Employers—or anyone, for that matter—
may choose to compare the U.S. Google results to the specific EU
Google results to find out if their workers are trying to hide something
from them. Not long ago, only basic computer skills were needed to
make such a comparison: individuals only needed to click on the link that
says “Use Google.com” in the bottom right-hand corner of the Google
homepage.146 Such comparison enabled these employers to quickly
144. Other than reasons listed here, there are many potential reasons why the right to be
delisted could be considered inapplicable. One example is “the Streisand effect,” named after Barbra
Streisand, which attempted to suppress photographs of her residence in Malibu inadvertently
generated further publicity of it. Under such effect, the efforts to suppress online information can
backfire and end up making things worse for the would-be censor. In the context of the right to be
forgotten, Mario Costeja González became famous due to the EU ruling. Instead of being forgotten,
Mr. González is now well known across the globe. However, the fact that Mr. González is now
famous does not imply that every person that will request erasure will be remembered. The Streisand
effect will probably not occur with the high magnitude of removal requests. Another example is that
the right to be delisted could also be abused commercially. See Letter from Peter Fleischer, supra
note 83, at 6 (“Historically, we have seen [sic] many cases of business competitors trying to abuse
removals processes to reduce each others’ web presence.”). For more on the Streisand effect, see
T.C., What is the Streisand Effect?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 15, 2013, 11:50 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economist-explains-what-streisandeffect [https://perma.cc/R25X-SWS9].
145. The ECJ refrained from addressing the question of whether the right applies outside the
EU. The Working Party identified the potential problem of the territorial effects of a delisting
decision, and clearly stated that such behavior would be considered insufficient to comply with the
Directive requirements. While the Working Party does not possess enforcement power over Google,
it generally reflects the positions of national regulators in the EU, and thus could quickly become
obligatory and enforceable for Google and other search engines. See Working Party, supra note 53,
at 3; Sam Schechner & Frances Robinson, EU Says Google Should Extend ‘Right to Be Forgotten’
to ‘.com’ Websites, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-says-googleshould-extend-right-to-be-forgotten-to-com-websites-1417006254; Liam Tung, Bing and Yahoo
Respond to ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Requests, ZDNET (Dec. 1, 2014) http://www.zdnet.com/
article/bing-and-yahoo-respond-to-right-to-be-forgotten-requests.
146. Currently, almost every non-EU search domain will not be part of the right to be delisted.
Peter Fleischer, Google’s Global privacy counsel, states, “We do not read the decision by the Court
of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) in the case C-131/12 (the “Decision”) as global in
reach—it was an application of European law that applies to services offered to Europeans.” See
Letter from Peter Fleischer, supra note 83, at 3. But such practice might change in light of
regulation. Beyond the Working Party’s recommendations on this matter, local data protection
agencies have begun to instruct that the right to be forgotten must be applied across all versions of
the search engine. The French data protection authority (CNIL) recently decided in such manner
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discover the more hidden search results, as they will be missing from the
specific EU Google domain.147
But as regulators quickly acknowledged, such problem could be
resolved easily. Regulators could oblige search engines that operate in
the EU, or perhaps even process data of EU citizens, to comply with the
right to be delisted for all domains, meaning that the delisting will occur
on all of their services; restrict access to such sites;148 or use geolocation
technology to restrict access to information for EU citizens.149 While
matters of jurisdiction and borders are highly controversial in the digital
environment,150 few courts have already obliged Google to remove
results from all Google domains.151 Recent reports suggest that search
results removals are now applied to domains (including Google.com)
beyond Europe, if the browser is located within the European Union.152
against Google, and Google’s informal appeal on this decision to the CNIL was rejected. Google’s
case will most likely be decided by the French Supreme Court. See Mason Hayes & Curran, Right to
Be Forgotten Going Global – French Regulator Orders Takedown on .coms, SILICON REPUBLIC
(Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.siliconrepublic.com/enterprise/2015/11/02/right-to-be-forgotten-cnilfrance-eu; Samuel Gibbs, French Data Regulator Rejects Google’s Right-to-Be-Forgotten Appeal,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/sep/21/french-googleright-to-be-forgotten-appeal [https://perma.cc/47GA-B3XL]; Working Party, supra note 53, at 9.
147. Jonathan Zittrain, Don’t Force Google to ‘Forget’, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/15/opinion/dont-force-google-to-forget.html?_r=0
(“Even
in
Europe, search engine users will no doubt cultivate the same Internet “workarounds” that Chinese
citizens use to see what their government doesn’t want them to see.”).
148. In this context, restriction means that EU member states will pass regulation which will
place civil, administrative or criminal liability on their citizens and/or third-parties for using search
engines outside of the EU.
149. Horatia Muir Watt, Yahoo! Cyber Collision of Cultures: Who Regulates?, 24 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 673, 683 (2003) (“[G]eographical indeterminacy on the Internet is not inevitable, but results
from ideological choice.”); Steven C. Bennett, The “Right to Be Forgotten”: Reconciling EU and
US Perspectives, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 161, 190 (2012). However, even the use of such
technologies could by bypassed by users. See, e.g., Justice S. Muralidhar, Jurisdictional Issues in
Cyberspace, 6 INDIAN J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2010) (“Even while it was thought that one could fix the
physical location of the computer from where the transaction originates and the one where it ends,
that too can be bypassed or ‘masked.’”).
150. For a general discussion on jurisdiction and territoriality in the Internet, see David R.
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L REV. 1367
(1996); Henry H. Perrit, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1996); Joel R.
Reidenberg, States and Internet Enforcement, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 213 (2004).
151. See Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack, 2014 BCSC 1063 (Can.) for an example in Canada
where the Supreme Court of British Columbia ordered Google to delete links to various websites. In
terms of the right to be delisted, a French court fined Google for delisting results on its French
subsidiary but not globally. See Lisa Vaas, Google Fined for Not Taking Down “Right to Be Forgotten” Links Worldwide, NAKEDSECURITY (Nov. 19, 2014), https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/
2014/11/19/google-fined-for-not-taking-down-right-to-be-forgotten-links-worldwide
[https://perma.cc/YMG6-UWVS].
152. See Samuel Gibbs, Google to Extend ‘Right to be Forgotten’ to All Its Domains Accessed
in EU, GUARDIAN (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/11/googleextend-right-to-be-forgotten-googlecom [https://perma.cc/QZB6-MZYD].
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But requiring such geolocation technologies would place a high burden
on search engines, would raise privacy concerns, could stifle innovation,
and could be generally dangerous for democratic societies.153 Thus,
unless EU citizens will be legally and/or technologically restricted from
using search engines that operate outside the EU, the ability of the right
to be delisted to achieve its purposes is unlikely.154 But beyond technical
problems, the right to be delisted raises pragmatic problems arising from
Google’s relatively unusual new role as a courthouse.
1. Decision-Making and Asymmetrical Information
Decision-making under the right to be delisted currently
necessitates a nonautomated procedure. Unlike copyright infringement
claims under a notice-and-takedown regime,155 the right to be delisted is
based upon human intervention, at least for now. Examiners are tasked
with deciding which search results are inadequate, irrelevant, no longer
relevant, or excessive. In order to evaluate whether to delist the data
subject from search results, search engines’ operators provide guidelines
for their examiners to follow. However, as this Article further argues,
such guidelines are technically almost impossible to meet, especially
when search engines are the deciders, and this could lead to suboptimal
results.
The four components of the right to be delisted are vague. Deciding
whether content is inadequate, irrelevant, no longer relevant, or excessive
requires a more substantive record and more evidence than a few notes
written in an online form. It necessitates context. The decider needs to
obtain background information on the data subject and the consequences
surrounding the request. It may also require depositions, testimonies, and
other types of evidence, which cannot be provided under the current
practice. There may also be another side to the story, which search
engines will not be aware of. It would be highly difficult, if not
impossible, to evaluate such requests, when the only information
examined is provided by the requester, and the evaluators rely only on

153. For an overview of such potential normative and pragmatic difficulties, see Bennett, supra
note 149, at 191–92.
154. It should be noted that currently more than 95% of all search queries in Google
originating in Europe are on local versions, not Google.com. However, such practice may change in
light of the right to be delisted and/or forgotten. See LUCIANO FLORIDI, ET. AL, REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO GOOGLE ON THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 19 (2015),
https://buermeyer.de/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Report-of-the-Advisory-Committee-toGoogle-on-the-Right-to-be-Forgotten.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PV2-2PCU] (providing statistical use of
Google in Europe).
155. See supra note 88.
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what the requester claims to be accurate.156 This is mainly due to the ex
parte nature of the process and its secrecy. The process eventually leads
to information gaps caused by imperfect or asymmetrical information,157
which could be partially resolved under a judicial proceeding. Only
through the crucible of an adversarial proceeding can a decision-maker
fully comprehend the consequences of his or her judgments.
But the main problem is the decision process itself. One concern
relates to the nature of the four components of the right to be delisted.
Currently, the vagueness of how search engines should operate under the
ECJ ruling presents a major challenge. Search engines require more
detailed guidelines on how to interpret the ECJ ruling, which could aid
them in deciding what is “inadequate, irrelevant, no longer relevant, or
excessive.”158 Until then, the decision-making procedure will be either
performed according to the search engine’s own internal guidelines, or
even worse, be merely arbitrary. That makes Google not only a judge,
but also a regulator, as it creates the rules for the right to be delisted.
Another concern is the expertise of examiners. Examiners are
Google employees. They are not necessarily equipped with proper
expertise to evaluate complex requests. They are not likely to be retired
judges or to have ever held any judicial position in their life. Many of
them, though not all, are probably not experts in the field of EU privacy
or information laws, either.159 They are not necessarily even familiar with
EU domestic law or the culture of the requester, which could be relevant
to the examination. Aside from the normative problems such concerns
raise, it might prove difficult for such examiners to make decisions. It is
not merely an information gap problem, but rather one of necessary
expertise to make difficult evaluations. Over time, such examiners could
acquire expertise. Currently, the nontransparent nature of the removal
process and the relatively short time the process has existed does not
enable an evaluation of whether examiners are capable of acquiring

156. Peter Fleischer states,
We generally have to rely on the requester for information, without assurance beyond the
requester’s own assertions as to its accuracy. Some requests turn out to have been made
with false and inaccurate information. Even if requesters provide us with accurate
information, they understandably may avoid presenting facts that are not in their favour.
As such, we may not become aware of relevant context that would speak in favour of
preserving the accessibility of a search result.
Letter from Peter Fleischer, supra note 83, at 12 (emphasis added).
157. R. George Wright, The Right to Be Forgotten: Issuing a Voluntary Recall, 7 DREXEL L.
REV. 401, 414 (2015).
158. While the Working Party provided some guidelines, they were highly limited and did not
address all components. See Working Party, supra note 53, at 11–20.
159. See Lee, supra note 10, at 44 (suggesting that employees at the national DPAs may
possess greater knowledge of EU privacy law than Google’s employees).

144

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 40:115

expertise. Moreover, acquiring such expertise could take time.
Meanwhile, Google’s examiners could be making uneducated decisions.
2. Costs and High Barriers of Market Entry
Exercising the right to be delisted is expensive. The removal
process requires a decision by many human beings160 and, therefore,
demands allocating financial resources.161 Another potential cost of
implementation of the right to be delisted will arise if search engines
become obliged to use geolocation technology to restrict access to
information for EU citizens.162 Such financial aspects raise pragmatic
concerns as the magnitude of removal requests is relatively high and
should not be taken lightly. In June 2016, two years after Google
initiated their removal process, it received 443,501 requests containing
1,553,218 URLs that it had to evaluate for removal.163 Roughly, this
amounts to 2,065 URLs per day, every day.164 Relying on such statistics,
it is financially difficult for any search engine to fully comply with the
right to be delisted.
Shortly after the ECJ ruling, even Google officials warned that the
removal process might be beyond their financial capabilities.165 It is not.
While the quality of Google’s decisions may be questionable,166 in terms
of managing the quantity of requests, it has done a rather good job thus
far. Nevertheless, while Google currently possesses sufficient financial
resources to comply with the EU decision, less wealthy search engines

160. Peter Fleischer, Google’s Global privacy counsel, stated, “We have many people working
full time on the process, and ensuring enough resources are available for the processing of requests
required a significant hiring effort.” Letter from Peter Fleischer, supra note 83, at 10.
161. The creation of the removal process itself should not be expensive. Creating an online
“removal” form for EU members is the easy part for search engines. It is relatively not costly, and
does not require allocating many human resources. Therefore, such obligation is not costly and
would not place a high burden on search engines and thereby will not place a high barrier for market
entry.
162. For further discussion of the ramifications of geographical borders online, see generally
Johnson & Post, supra note 149.
163. See European Privacy Requests for Search Removals, supra note 135.
164. Google officially launched their removal process in May 29, 2014, which means that 752
days passed until the compared statistics of removal dated in June 20, 2016. It should be noted that
after Google launched their services, they reported a rate of 10,000 removal requests per day. See id.
165. See Martha Mendoza & Toby Sterling, Google ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Ruling Unlikely to
Repeat in U.S., NBC NEWS (May 26, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/google-right-beforgotten-ruling-unlikely-repeat-u-s-n114731 [https://perma.cc/7CMB-HB2E] (quoting Al Verney,
Google spokesman: “It seems aspirational, not a reality, to comply with such a standard . . . The reengineering necessary to implement the right to be forgotten is significant.”).
166. I further discuss the potential normative difficulties which arise from Google’s process,
which is difficult to assess due to lack of full transparency in Part III.B.

2016]

Privatization of the Judiciary

145

might not.167 Thus, the high costs of compliance create another problem:
they pose high barriers to market entry, and encourage an oligopoly
market. In that sense, Google might actually benefit from the right to be
delisted, as it could reduce competition and eliminate new search
engines. New search engines will have much difficulty with complying
with the ECJ ruling. Society loses in such a scenario, as innovation could
take a huge hit.168 Perhaps the ECJ decision leaves some room for
interpretation regarding non-wealthy search engines, incapable of dealing
with such process.169 However, such a statement by the ECJ is subject to
interpretation and does not necessarily exempt search engines lacking
financial resources.
B. The Normative Aspect
Normatively, the right to be delisted raises many concerns due to
the fact that search engines are now making decisions for which they are
unequipped and for which they should not be tasked.170 The judicial
system, not search engines, is tasked with upholding the rule of law and
settling disputes. Under the ECJ ruling, search engines effectively
became one of the three branches of government.171 They should now be
treated as a much more formal part of the judicial system, making
judicial decisions on fundamental rights and liberties. This judicial role
raises many normative concerns.
1. The Problems of Judiciary Privatization
The state encodes rights into laws and uses threats and acts of
coercion to enforce them.172 Should some roles of the state be
167. Catherine Baksi, Right to Be Forgotten “Must Go,” Lords Committee Says, L. GAZETTE
(July 30, 2014), http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/right-to-be-forgotten-must-golords-committeesays/5042439.fullarticle [https://perma.cc/DMK7-G6HW].
168. See Antani, supra note 143, at 1205 (“[T]he burden of handling right to be forgotten
requests might favor larger internet entities like Google over smaller companies, stifling competition
and subduing the entrepreneurial spirit of the internet.”).
169. See Google Spain, supra note 7, ¶ 83 (under the ruling, search engines are only
subject to data protection rules “within the framework of its responsibilities, powers, and
capabilities.”).
170. Critics from the House of Lords in the United Kingdom argued that it is “‘wrong in
principle’ to leave it to search engines to decide whether or not to delete information, based on
‘vague, ambiguous and unhelpful’ criteria.” See Baksi, supra note 167.
171. Arguably, search engines could influence the three branches of government (legislative,
executive, and judicial) by, for example, using lobbyists and are therefore a “fourth branch of
government.” For more on lobbyists acting as a fourth branch of government, see for example, Alex
Knott, The ‘Fourth Branch’ of Government, ALTERNET (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.alternet.org/
story/21702/the_%27fourth_branch%27_of_government [https://perma.cc/V6XR-3NSY].
172. Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military
Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879, 885 (2004).
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monopolistic?173 And more specifically—should the judiciary?174 In
practice, these roles are not necessarily as monopolistic as we might
assume. Privatization, the shifting of government functions to the private
sector,175 often occurs under all three branches of the government.176
We can witness some forms of privatization of the executive branch
mainly in terms of enforcement. Many states have privatized policing.177
As part of this enforcement privatization, some states also have partially
privatized parts of their penal systems.178 Even militaries are partially
privatized.179 The legislative branch is also privatized to some extent.

173. Id. at 886–91 (suggesting the “monopoly thesis” regarding the use of force in society).
174. There are various justifications for the sole authority of the state to act as a judiciary.
Thomas Hobbes argued under the social contract, sovereign must control civil, military, judicial,
and ecclesiastical powers. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 183 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin
Classics 1981) (1651). John Locke argued that in the State of Nature, men could be biased by their
interest and partial to themselves. Justifying the sole authority of the state to act as a judiciary arises
mainly from the consent of individuals to partake in civil society. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES
OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). For more on the
Privatization of law and the framework which facilitates it, see Talia Fisher, The Privatization of
Law, 30 IYUNEI MISHPAT 517, 524–28 (2008) (Isr.).
175. Privatization can mean many things. It could describe the sale of state-owned assets,
deregulation, and contracting out the provision of goods and services. This article generally refers to
privatization as the shifting of government functions to the private sector. See Jody Freeman, Private
Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 822 (2000).
176. Many governments, like the U.S. Federal Government, are made up of three branches:
legislative, executive, and judicial. See Branches of Government, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
http://www.house.gov/content/learn/branches_of_government [https://perma.cc/676X-RWK2].
177. Privatization of policing occurs through, inter alia, “private security laws,” which enable
the formation of a private security industry. Such industry employs guards, patrol personnel, and
detectives. Beyond industrial facilities and commercial establishments, such security firms,
sometimes also operate in office buildings, airports, shopping districts, and residential
neighborhoods, thus privatizing roles of the police. For more on the privatization of enforcement, see
Stephin Rushin, The Regulation of Private Police, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 159 (2012); David A.
Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165 (1998); Rosky, supra note 172.
178. Under such privatization in the United States, by the early 1980s the government recruited
private corporations to provide prison services. See Douglas C. McDonald, Public Imprisonment by
Private Means: The Reemergence of Private Prisons and Jails in the United States, the United
Kingdom and Australia, 34 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 29, 29–32 (1994); Rosky, supra note 172, at 902.
179. By privatization of the military, I mostly refer to the emergence of private military
companies (PMCs) which offer training of troops, logistical support and specialization, military
equipment and supplies, intelligence systems, materiel procurement, static-site defense, and
peacekeeping. However, there are even some examples of privatization of actual combat. Two such
examples are “Executive Outcomes” and “Sandline International,” two companies which engaged in
direct military conflict for clients, mostly in Africa. In addition, there are numerous PMCs which
were actively engaging in combat in Bosnia, Columbia, and around the world. See generally P.W.
Singer, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY (2003);
Jonathan Weisman & Anitha Reddy, Spending on Iraq Sets Off Gold Rush, WASH. POST (Oct. 9,
2003), at A1 (discussing the services provided by private military companies in Iraq); Sam Kiley,
Send in the Mercenaries, Mr. Cook, TIMES (London), Jan. 22, 1999, LEXIS, News Library, Times
File; Rosky, supra note 172, at 904–12.
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Regulation in many instances involves private actors.180 Aside from
private contributions to regulation, legislators often ask Standard Setting
Organizations (SSOs) to produce standards that turn into legislation,181
and sometimes delegate power to self-regulatory bodies.182 The judiciary
is no exception to such privatization in modern society.183 Adjudication
many times shifts to private systems of justice like those utilizing
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) procedures. In California, the
judiciary was partially privatized through a procedure commonly referred
to as “rent-a-judge.”184 Many private parties also conduct some form of
adjudication.185 The ECJ ruling expands such judiciary privatization, and
as this Article further suggests, the judicial role under the right to be delisted has different characteristics.
There are several arguments as to why Google should act as a
judiciary under the right to be delisted. They begin with a pragmatic
argument of economic efficiency. If Google serves as a more efficient
judicial system than courts and DPAs in EU Member States, then from
an economic perspective, it should be placed in such position. Generally,
it could be more economically efficient to place the burden of removing
links to content on search engines and/or other intermediaries than on
courts. Courts are usually overloaded with cases as it is,186 and the
magnitude of removal requests could have possibly led to a highly slow
mechanism, that is, if courts could even cope with such a magnitude of
180. Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory
Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 171 (1995); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance,
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 551 (2000).
181. See Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions,
84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 433–36 (2006).
182. Freeman, supra note 180, at 551.
183. History tells an interesting story on the state and the judiciary. Interestingly, judicial
services preceded the formation of the state. In primitive societies, while there was no concept of
public law, there was often adjudication. See Landes & Posner, supra note 74, at 242–53.
184. “Rent-a-judge” usually refers to a procedure which allows opposing sides in civil
suits to hire a retired judge or a “referee” to settle a dispute. Unlike traditional ADR, their
judgments have the same effect as judgments of any other state court, as they are considered part of
the state court system. Sara Terry, Rent-a-judge: A Fast Way to ‘Day in Court’, CSMONITOR (Feb.
9, 1982), http://www.csmonitor.com/1982/0209/020935.html [https://perma.cc/FV64-FMEY]. For
more on private adjudication, see Anne S. Kim, Rent-a-Judges and the Cost of Selling Justice, 44
DUKE L.J. 166 (1994); Steve Russell, Rent-a-Judge and Hide-a-Crime: The Dark Potential of
Private Adjudication, in PRIVATIZATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PAST PRESENT AND FUTURE 113
(David Shichor & Michael J. Gilbert eds., 2000).
185. Insurance companies, for example, will review claims and decide whether it fits their
contractual obligation. But generally, such adjudication will usually fall under examination of
internal policies and/or contractual obligation, and the results of the dispute will only apply to rights
of the individuals, which are linked to the company and/or institution. It thereby does not generally
replace the role of courts in settling disputes.
186. See ABA ACTION COMM’N TO REDUCE COURT COSTS AND DELAY, ATTACKING
LITIGATION COSTS AND DELAY 1 (1984).
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requests in the first place. On the other hand, many search engines
employ large numbers of workers and usually have vast financial
resources that could be allocated to deal with such a high magnitude of
removal requests.187
Search engines are most likely in the best position to prevent
misconduct at a reasonably low cost.188 It is easier and cheaper to sue
Google than every website, especially since website operators could be
located abroad.189 In addition, aside from the problem of asymmetric
information,190 search engines are economically in the best position to
delist; after all, search engines are the very entities that manage the lists.
As shown from the pragmatic aspect of the right to be delisted, Google
services are efficient, as they provide judgments quickly. The supply of
courts or DPAs might not satisfy the magnitude of removal requests, i.e.,
the demand. Search engines are likely more efficient than the current
overloaded judicial system, which relies on limited public financial
resources. The mechanism used by Google reduces transaction costs for
the parties involved in the dispute, which would be higher if courts were
involved.191 In addition, making search engines decision-makers could
reduce chances of conflicting decisions, if say, DPAs or courts in the
twenty-eight EU Member States were making such decisions.192 In other
words, placing liability on search engines eliminates courts from serving
as a middleman, and directly links the data subject with the controller of
the information (or the controller of the link to the information). Thus,

187. Naturally, variance depends on the search engine in question and the magnitude of the
removal requests.
188. Assaf Hamdani, Who’s Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 911 (2002)
(explaining why online intermediaries are sometimes liable for the wrongdoings of their users).
189. Although the European Commission has emphasized that the right to be forgotten (and the
right to be delisted for that matter) would apply even when the “personal data is handled abroad by
companies that are active in the EU market” or “offer their services to EU citizens,” this task will not
be achieved easily as many users will ignore notices, will not necessarily grasp the choice and resist
making them unless compelled to do so. See Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission
Proposes a Comprehensive Reform of Data Protection Rules to Increase Users’ Control of their Data
and to Cut Costs for Businesses (2012) IP/12/46; Muge Fazlioglu, Forget Me Not: The Clash of the
Right to Be Forgotten and Freedom of Expression on the Internet, 3 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 149,
151 (2013) (making this argument); Christopher Kuner et al., The Challenge of “Big Data” for Data
Protection, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 47, 48 (2012) (arguing that mounting evidence shows that
individuals ignore notices, often do not understand the choices and resist making them unless compelled to do so).
190. See supra Part III.A.
191. Geoffrey C. Hazard & Paul D. Scott, The Public Nature of Private Adjudication, 6 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 42 (1988) (“Civil cases generally involve seemingly excessive transaction costs,
both for the parties and for the public.”).
192. See Lee, supra note 10, at 50.
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from an economic perspective, placing liability on search engines could
be justified.193
But the Google courthouse raises a few normative concerns that
could surpass economic considerations. First, the judicial role of Google
could potentially erode traditional judicial authority. Courts settle
disputes; that is their primary purpose.194 Beyond dispute settling, courts,
at least in common law jurisdictions, have another important function:
they engage in rulemaking.195 They play an important role in society to
“explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative
texts . . . to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with
them.”196 Public courts speak for society and their decisions carry social
weight, far greater than the decisions of private courts.197 Thus, making
search engines courthouses—separate from other search engines who
also act as courthouses—could risk the development of the law.198
Moreover, practical difficulties should not always prevail over a
normative argument, especially where public interests and values are at
stake.199 Even economists would most likely agree that economic
efficiency should not transfer the role of the state in judicial services.200
Thus, the economic argument does not prevail here. While privatization
of the judiciary could be justified in some cases, it cannot be for the right
to be delisted, as public laws or public values are involved. Such cases
must be reserved for a public judiciary, not Google.201
Another concern of privatization is public accountability.
Privatizing adjudication of the right to be delisted diminishes the public
accountability of the judicial system. The public accountability argument
193. However, it should be noted that such assessments rely on assumptions which should be
further analyzed by economists.
194. See Landes & Posner, supra note 74, at 236.
195. Id.
196. Owen Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984).
197. Hazard & Scott, supra note 191; Kim, supra note 184, at 190.
198. The existence of several data processors combined with lack of transparency, places the
decisions in a vacuum, preventing learning from other decisions. When we categorize these data
controllers as digital courthouses, this could be articulated as the lack of legal precedents. These
courthouses might have the opportunity to learn from their own rulings, depending on the data
controller judicial mechanism, but not from other similar courthouses. While civil liability usually
relies on factual foundations, no such burden is placed on data subjects under the GDPR. See GDPR,
supra note 29, at art. 17; Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 72, at 369. See generally Tracy Walters
McCormack, Privatizing the Justice System, 25 REV. LITIG. 735 (2006).
199. See Lee, supra note 10, at 32 (“[W]here important public interests and values are at stake,
governments should consider more than simply transaction costs.”); Verkuil, supra note 181.
200. See 2 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 231 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1976); Landes &
Posner, supra note 74, at 235; Verkuil, supra note 181, at 456 (“The appropriate roles of the public
and private sector raise questions beyond efficiency concerns.”).
201. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 668, 676 (1986); Kim, supra note 184, at 194.
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is divided into two groups turning on the distinction between public and
private institutional purposes and the distinction between public and
private accountability mechanisms.202 The first concern relates to the
different purposes of the judicial system and Google. Google pursues
economic gains more than political and legal goals.203 The second
concern rests on the assumption that the judicial system and Google rely
upon different accountability mechanisms. While the judicial system
relies on electoral accountability, Google relies on market
accountability.204
The accountability arguments against privatization mostly rely on
the nature of search engines. They are for-profit, commercial entities that
were not chosen by the public to uphold a judiciary position. The
individuals who make the decisions are not public officials, and their
identity is hidden from the public. As the process is highly opaque and
lacks proper oversight (such attributes will be further discussed in the
next part), and as very few individuals currently appeal Google’s
decisions,205 search engines will not be held accountable for most of their
decisions. Overall, Google lacks public accountability for its decisions.206
The final concern is one of appellate remedies and is more of a
general criticism of the right to be delisted. In most states, litigants are
guaranteed at least one appeal as of right.207 Such an appellate remedy is
generally granted to protect against arbitrary or erroneous application of
the law, to promote the development and standardization of legal
doctrine, and to assist in standardizing outcomes for similarly situated
litigants.208 Such protections are not granted under the right to be
delisted, as the appeal procedure is flawed. The European data subject is
entitled to request that a local DPA review the decision and may even
file a lawsuit against Google based upon its rejection.209 But Google does
not provide enough data on the rejection of claims to the claimant.210
202. See Rosky, supra note 172, at 939.
203. ROBERT LEKACHMAN, VISIONS AND NIGHTMARES: AMERICA AFTER REAGAN 104–06
(1987) (noting that private corporations are motivated primarily by profit maximization); Rosky,
supra note 172, at 939.
204. See Rosky, supra note 172, at 940.
205. See Panetta, supra note 138.
206. See Lee, supra note 10, at 43 (“Google’s employees are not public officials. Google’s
employees cannot be held accountable by the public in same way as public officials (e.g., civil
servants, judges, or legislators) can.”).
207. Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 503, 513–14 (1992).
208. Barbara B. Crabb, In Defense of Direct Appeals: A Further Reply to Professor
Chemerinsky, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 137, 138 (1997); Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to
Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219, 1230 (2013).
209. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 117.
210. See Lee, supra note 10, at 45–46.
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Moreover, while webmasters currently may request Google to reconsider
a decision,211 other impacted parties—most importantly, members of
society—do not receive such right as they are unaware of any
proceedings, and the option of a counter-notice does not constitute an
appeal. Leaving the judicial role with the courts could enable at least
third parties to participate in the controversy. Moreover, even if the right
to be delisted will be adjudicated by courts without a de facto right to
appeal, the decision will still be made by a judicial entity that is subject
to some oversight, is generally more equipped to make educated
decisions, and is more accountable for its decisions.
2. Transparency and Oversight
Transparency plays a crucial role in judicial processes. The process
for exercising the right to be delisted is almost entirely opaque. Legally,
there is currently no requirement under EU data protection laws to
provide any sort of information on the process or the removed links. On
the contrary, search engines are most likely forbidden from handing out
information on removal requests.212 Search engines like Google do
publish transparency reports and provide some insights into their
process.213 Under its transparency report, Google provides a general
numerical count of the total URLs that it evaluated for removal, the total
requests that it received, the percentages of removals and rejections, a
few examples of requests it received from individuals, and finally a site
listing of the “most impacted websites” from such requests.214 But such
information is highly limited and should not constitute sufficient
transparency. Contrast this reporting, for example, with the copyright
notice-and-takedown regime, in which online service providers usually
notify users that search results had been removed, and third parties, like
Lumen, publish removal requests.215
211. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 117.
212. As for informing webmasters on delisting, the Working Party instructed search engines’
managers, as a general practice, to not “inform the webmasters of the pages affected by de-listing of
the fact that some webpages cannot be acceded from the search engine in response to specific
queries.” See Working Party, supra note 53, at 10.
213. Google declares, “As a company we feel it is our responsibility to ensure that we
maximize transparency around the flow of information related to our tools and services. We believe
that more information means more choice, more freedom, and ultimately more power for the
individual.” Google declares that “a copy of each legal notice we receive may be sent to the Lumen
project for publication and annotation” or published in their transparency report. Practically, no such
legal notice was published in Lumen yet. See Legal Removal Requests, GOOGLE,
https://support.google.com/legal/answer/3110420?rd=1&hl=en [https://perma.cc/QXT4-2SBG]. For
more on Lumen, see supra note 107.
214. See supra note 163.
215. See Lumen, supra note 107. Yahoo! indicates that they may “include a notice to users on
[their] search results pages informing them that some results have been blocked pursuant to EU
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The fact that some search engines publish transparency reports and
provide insights to their process is important. While still limited, the
current form of transparency Google provides is crucial for oversight and
protection of fundamental rights. Knowing that Google does not reject
nor accept all removal requests indicates that probably some form of
decision-making occurs under its procedure. But this is far from enough.
We need access to information on the nature of requests, such as what
information typically gets delisted and what does not. While Google
provides some examples of the requests and its decisions, such
hand-picked, anecdotal evidence should not be treated as representative
of the process.
Transparency is highly crucial for preserving fundamental rights.
Beyond the fact that many search engines are publicly traded
companies,216 and thereby many of their actions must be observable by
outsiders, the importance of transparency dramatically rises when these
search engines act as courthouses. Lack of transparency arguably better
protects the right to be delisted and will probably also exist in a
traditional judiciary.217 But this argument should not turn search engines
into judges. If adjudication by search engines under the right to be
delisted cannot be transparent, then we should not let search engines
replace the judiciary—that is, unless we place search engines merely as a
preliminary process before the judiciary. Not all courts are fully
transparent. Some court hearings are behind closed doors, and some
courts are even considered “secret courts.”218 Even if the judicial role
under the right to be delisted will be placed on courts, they will most
likely be opaque. The difference, however, is mainly the impartiality and
law.” See Requests to Block Search Results in Yahoo Search, supra note 109. But transparency in the
right to be delisted should be differentiated from take-down notices of intellectual property
infringements. In terms of copyright, the content is removed and only a description of what was
removed is publicized. Information has a different nature, and the removal process would require
publishing the information that was delisted. But this might undermine what the right to be delisted
attempts to achieve. It could even lead to a less desired outcome in which the content is more readily
available now, and that it could even attract the attention of individuals to why the subject matter
asked to delink those webpages from the search engine. For more on Lumen, see Lumen, supra note
107.
216. For a list of publicly-traded companies which include Google (now a subsidiary of
Alphabet Inc.) and Microsoft (which operates Bing), see The World’s Biggest Public Companies,
FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/global2000/list/#tab:overall (last visited Jan. 17, 2016).
217. If the right to be delisted decisions, without PIIs, were publicly available, then arguably
individuals could analyze the outcomes of such requests and learn how to manipulate the systems.
However, this would hardly be different from the judicial process, in which individuals, and perhaps
mostly lawyers, could try to learn patterns in the application of the law by courts.
218. Such example is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) in the United States, a
“secret court” that examine classified information relating to national security. See Peter Margulies,
The NSA in Global Perspective: Surveillance, Human Rights, and International Counterterrorism,
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 2139 (2014).
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public accountability of such courts, which requires them to act under the
rule of law.
The second normative concern comes from the lack of proper
oversight. Someone must judge the judges. Without such oversight,
search engines could misuse or even abuse their authority without
repercussions. Oversight, in this matter, does not impede the right to be
delisted. Prima facie, oversight exists under the right to be delisted, as
data subjects can appeal to a DPA or a court on search engines’
decisions. But as previously noted, this appeal process is flawed because
it appears that most individuals effectively do not appeal, and it does not
grant oversight on the accepted requests because there is no one to make
an appeal. Even if oversight is problematic under the right to be delisted,
much like in the concern of transparency, leaving adjudication in the
courts could be important due to their impartiality and the public
accountability of such courts to act under the rule of law.
3. Procedural Safeguards
One of the major difficulties of the right to be delisted is the
negative impact on procedural safeguards.219 Procedural safeguards could
highly vary between states and legal systems, and Google’s role as a
judiciary under the right to be delisted should be scrutinized by each EU
Member State or any other state that legislates such right.220 The goal of
this part is more normative than pragmatic: to examine general
characterizations of procedural safeguards, commonly referred to in
many countries as due process. Due process is usually divided into two
separate categories: procedural due process and substantive due
process.221 What is most relevant here is procedural due process, which
conventionally means that deprivations of life, liberty, and property must
accord with lawful process.222 It is generally comprised of sufficient
notice, a right to an impartial arbiter, and a right to give testimony and
admit evidence.
The first part of due process, sufficient notice, will present a
problem that arises more from the right to be delisted itself than from the
219. See Lee, supra note 10, at 45–46 (arguing that Google only grants minimal due process in
the right to be forgotten [delisted] removal process).
220. For a comparison of due process in the U.S. and the EU, see David E. Shipley, Due
Process Rights Before EU Agencies: The Rights of Defense, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2008).
221. For a distinction between substantive due process and procedural due process, see Ryan
C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 418–19
(2010).
222. Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Essay, Due Process as Separation of
Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1776 (2012); Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127
HARV. L. REV. 1885, 1890 (2014).
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role of search engines in the process. Some notice exists under the
removal process. Google notifies the data subject and, in some instances,
the webmaster of the URL that is requested for removal regarding the
removal request and Google’s decision.223 While it seems that Article
7(c) and 7(f) of the DPD permit this disclosure,224 under the instructions
of the Working Party, such notification to webmasters might not be legal
as a general practice,225 but rather only in cases where the search engine
needs to obtain additional information for the assessment of the
circumstances surrounding that request.226 However, there is another
party to the controversy that does not get any form of notice but is
deprived of liberty: other members of society.
The second potential procedural safeguard that specifically relates
to search engines is the right to an impartial arbiter. Judges should be
impartial.227 Their decisions are unbiased, at least to some extent.228 The
judicial system as a whole, when it works properly, is generally
impartial. However, when granting a judicial role to a for-profit,
commercial entity, bias is almost inevitable.229 Google, Yahoo!, and
Bing, among other search engines, possess commercial and business
incentives and policies. Their primary goal is to increase the wealth of

223. It should be noted that Google only sends the webmasters the affected URLs, not the
requester’s name. However, in many cases, the requester’s name should be obvious from the URL.
See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 117. Yahoo! indicates that they may “notify the
operators or webmasters of websites impacted by your request.” See Requests to Block Search
Results in Yahoo Search, supra note 109.
224. EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 6, arts. 7(c), 7(f); Letter from Peter Fleischer,
supra note 83, at 6.
225. See Working Party, supra note 53, at 3 (“Search engines should not as a general practice
inform the webmasters of the pages affected by removals of the fact that some web pages cannot be
acceded from the search engine in response to a specific name-based query.”).
226. Id.
227. Cf. Tal Z. Zarsky, Social Justice, Social Norms and the Governance of Social Media, 35
PACE L. REV. 154, 163 (2014) (arguing that judges are, inter alia, subject to local pressures and of
course local law).
228. Judges are human beings, and are therefore subject to various cognitive bias. One example
is adjustment and anchoring bias: when people estimate, they have a starting value that is adjusted to
the final answer. For more on adjustment and anchoring bias, see Paul Slovic & Sarah Lichtenstein,
Comparison of Bayesian and Regression Approaches in the Study of Information Processing in
Judgment, 6 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 649 (1971); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 32 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982);
Avishalom Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 4 HAIFA L. REV. 237, 251–54
(2008); Colin Miller, Anchors Away: Why the Anchoring Effect Suggests that Judges Should Be Able
to Participate in Plea Discussions, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1667 (2013). However, as such cognitive bias
impacts all humankind, the examiners of search engines should be equally affected by them.
229. See Lee, supra note 10, at 44–45 (suggesting that Google is biased in termed of the right
to be forgotten).
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their shareholders.230 Such policies create a bias that is troubling when
they are acting as judiciaries. Such bias could move Google to act over or
underinclusively, depending on the specific reason behind its bias.
Biases will generally result from competition and incentives.
Search engines compete with each other. When displaying search
results, they often favor their own services if they exist.231 They may also
favor their own advertisers and affiliated corporate providers when
providing search results.232 They also compete on traffic with other
websites that provide services. Some of these companies, like Google,
are more than simply search engines. Indeed, they are a subsidiary of a
parent company (Alphabet Inc.) that owns and operates various types of
services, like social media platforms. Therefore, they are competing with
other operators. Search engines might abuse their power to reduce traffic
to competing services and websites. As the transparency of requests is
highly limited, especially when they are approved, the lack of oversight
would permit such practice without fear of antitrust violation or any
other form of liability.
Then we have incentives. Search engines have two opposing
incentives. On the one hand, their business models rely on information
and access to this information. Removing links from their search results
is against their incentive to provide accurate information and as much of
it as possible. When they are not providing a search result that exists on
the web, they are not performing the task that is at the heart of their
business model. On the other hand, risking liability could be costly. To
that end, search engines might choose to act overinclusively rather than
underinclusively when making decisions.233 Such overinclusiveness
clearly leads to endangering freedom of information and speech, but it
also leads to a biased mechanism by which search engines make
decisions—that is, based on incentives and not on facts. Judicial systems
should not be motivated by such considerations.
Finally, due process necessitates a right to give testimony and admit
evidence. As decisions are conducted behind closed doors, in an ex parte
procedure,234 the claimant is the only one able to make requests to
Google, and even he is not entitled to give oral testimony.235 Other
230. For such argument on the potential bias of Google in the application of the “right to be
forgotten” (meaning right to be delisted), see id. at 42.
231. Adam Raff, Op-Ed., Search, But You May Not Find, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/28/opinion/28raff.html?_r=0.
232. See Grimmelmann, supra note 78, at 21.
233. See Zittrain, supra note 147 (“[S]earch engines are likely to err on the safe side and
accede to most requests.”).
234. See Lee, supra note 10, at 45.
235. Id.

156

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 40:115

parties interested in the controversy have neither a right to give
testimony nor a right to admit evidence. If the role of the judiciary will
be placed on courts, then the claimant will have the opportunity to give
oral testimony, and perhaps even the publisher will have a chance to
dispute the claim.
4. Protecting Fundamental Rights
The right to be delisted might have a negative impact on
fundamental rights. The first set of rights are freedom of speech, freedom
of information, and freedom of the press.236 The second set of rights are
rights to privacy,237 and an individual’s right to protect personal data
concerning himself or herself.238 But here the argument goes beyond the
traditional criticism of the possible negative impact of the right to be
delisted on fundamental rights. Rather, the judicial role of search engines
raises an even greater threat to the protection of such rights.
I begin with the former set of rights. The right to be delisted could
be viewed as a form of Internet censorship,239 as it potentially threatens
speech,240 access to information, and the freedom of the press.241 Prima

236. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
Convention on Human Rights, as amended), 4 November 1950, Europe. T.S. No. 5, art 10
[hereinafter ECHR] (“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers.”); European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, 18 December 2000, O.J. (C 364) 1–22. The exercise of freedom of expression
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security,
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
ECHR, supra, at art. 10(2).
237. Privacy in the EU is generally protected as a fundamental right under the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 7, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 389, 393; Council of Europe
Member States are also protecting privacy. See ECHR, supra note 236, at art. 8 (“Everyone has the
right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”).
238. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 16,
Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47, art. 16(1) (“Everyone has the right to the protection of personal
data concerning them.”); Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8, 2000 O.J. (C
364) 1 (“Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.”);
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data
arts. 5–6, 8–9, Jan. 28, 1981, 1496 U.N.T.S. 65.
239. Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 72, at 373 (arguing that the right to be forgotten could
lead to censorship of the Internet).
240. See Jeffrey Rosen, Free Speech, Privacy, and the Web that Never Forgets, 9 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 345, 345 (2011) (“[A]lthough there are proposals in Europe and
around the world, that would allow us to escape our past, these rights pose grave threats to free
speech.”).
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facie, freedom of information does not suffer a huge impact.242 No
information is deleted from the original source. Unlike the right to be
forgotten, the right to be delisted only affects search engines’ queries
linked to a specific name where the link is to information that is
irrelevant, outdated, or otherwise inappropriate. The right only affects the
results obtained from searches of a person’s name and does not require
deletion of the link from the indexes of the search engine altogether. The
information is not removed from the Internet, only from a specific EU
domain.
However, search engines still play a crucial role in protecting such
fundamental rights. When Google stops linking to a website, it is highly
likely that fewer people will be able to locate it. Without links from
search engines, the Internet will remain a collection of data sets so large
and complex, they will be nearly impossible to use. Thus, the ECJ ruling
could have a huge impact on freedom of speech, freedom of information,
and freedom of the press. It also derogates the role of counter speech and
could disrupt the process of communication.243
The second set of rights relates to privacy and data protection.
Under the EU perception of privacy and data protection, the processing
carried out by search engines is liable to significantly affect the
fundamental rights to privacy244 and the protection of personal data.
Furthermore, the protection of these rights is crucial under the EU
regime. But beyond merely being important, such right to be delisted was
characterized in the EU as a fundamental or human right.245 Under the
right to be delisted, search engines, mainly Google, are the almost-sole
enforcer and judge.
Privatization of the judiciary raises concerns for the protection of
both sets of rights.246 Google will not protect human rights to the extent
that the traditional justice system will. Google might intentionally decide
on requests to cut costs or to better serve its business model. While
241. It should be noted that the right to be forgotten under the GDPR does address the question
of free expression. It states clearly that the right does “not apply to the extent that processing of the
personal data is necessary for exercising the right of freedom of expression and information.”
However, such a statement is rather vague and insufficient to protect such right. See GDPR, supra
note 29, at art. 17(3)(a); see also id. at art. 80(2) (“Member States shall by law reconcile the right to
the protection of personal data pursuant to this Regulation with the right to freedom of expression
and information.”).
242. For such argument, see Working Party, supra note 53, at 2 (“In practice, the impact of the
de-listing on individuals’ rights to freedom of expression and access to information will prove to be
very limited.”).
243. Robert G. Larson III, Forgetting the First Amendment: How Obscurity-Based Privacy and
a Right to Be Forgotten Are Incompatible with Free Speech, 18 COMM. L. & POL’Y 91, 114 (2013).
244. See supra note 237.
245. Google Spain, supra note 7, ¶¶ 81, 91, 97, 99.
246. In the context of privatization of force, see Rosky, supra note 172, at 943–50.
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current practice could suggest otherwise,247 search engines could, at
some point, be more likely to comply with many requests to remove
content to avoid litigation and partially to reduce costs, thereby removing
legitimate content and negatively impacting freedom of information.248
They might also cut back on labor and find methods to reduce costs.
They might find ways to improve the speed of the process. But such
practices could erode the protection of human rights.
5. Empowering the Powerful
It would seem that search engines were given a role that is not in
their best interests.249 While the right to be delisted clearly imposes a
financial burden on search engines, they could also benefit from their
judicial role due to information they receive in the process of
examination. Google already maintains vast amounts of power. It stores
vast amounts of information on individuals around the globe. But placing
Google in a judicial role enhances such power in a few ways. First, with
judicial powers, Google could shape norms. This argument might be a bit
naïve, in the sense that Google already possesses such ability, and
Google does not require a right to be delisted to shape how
individuals view information on the web. Mostly, it enhances its
information-gathering capabilities. While Google already possesses
enormous information-gathering capabilities, this argument is not naïve.
Under the removal process, Google asks for documentation of the
identity of the claimant, which it collects and stores.250 Beyond storing
information, it will now possess copies of personal documents, such as
driver’s licenses or national ID cards, from individuals in the EU.251
Furthermore, when Google investigates the facts asserted in removal
requests, it is able to gather more information on its users than is
currently available online. It could acquire better contextual knowledge
on the personal details of individuals’ lives.
247. For now, Google is hardly a rubber stamp, as they deny more requests than they grant. See
supra Part II.B.
248. Zittrain, supra note 147 (arguing that “search engines are likely to err on the safe side and
accede to most requests”).
249. Eric Schmidt, Google Chairman, stated that they “didn’t ask to be the decision maker.”
See Aoife White, Google EU Ruling Response Vetted as Complaints Pile, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 18,
2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-18/google-eu-ruling-response-vetted-ascomplaints-pile-up [https://perma.cc/FS39-MPQF].
250. See Search Removal Request under Data Protection Law in Europe, supra note 109.
However, Google states that they “use the identification documents that are submitted through the
web form solely to help us determine the authenticity of the request and we generally delete the copy
within a month of closing the removal request case.” See Letter from Peter Fleischer, supra note 83,
at 8.
251. See Dewey, supra note 130.
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Such power could be highly problematic. While everyone else is
forgetting, search engines now have more to remember. The main
concern is not that search engines will be made even more
knowledgeable, but rather that third parties could obtain such
information. As data mining is at the heart of search engines’ business
models,252 such information could be either traded to other companies or
even to governments. As we learned from Edward Snowden’s
revelations, the National Security Agency (NSA) gathered electronic
communications, including metadata and content, through public–private
partnerships with companies like Google, among others.253 Hence,
beyond commercial actions such as targeted advertising, search engines
might share information on EU citizens and residents with the U.S.
government or other governments.
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE PRIVATE JUDICIARY
It is difficult to prophesize which trajectory the right to be forgotten
will take. While the future of the right to be forgotten is uncertain, the
right to be delisted is already implemented, even beyond the EU.254 The
EU placed search engines in a judicial role to solve some of the problems
that arose from the e-memory revolution. Even if one accepts the notion
that search engines should be placed in such positions—and this Article
does not—it would be wise to first generally scrutinize whether a legal
252. For more on the practice of data mining see for example, Ira S. Rubenstein, Ronald D.
Lee & Paul M. Schwartz, Data Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and
Technological Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 261 (2008); Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the
Security–Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343, 353 (2008).
253. Edward Snowden revealed that the NSA runs two “internal” programs: First, a bulk
collection of call record information “metadata” pursuant to orders issued by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). Second, gathering electronic communications using two
methods: PRISM and upstream collection. Under PRISM, the NSA targets the contents of
communications of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located abroad, and where such
surveillance will result in acquiring foreign intelligence information. Under upstream collection, the
NSA gathers electronic communications, including metadata and content, of foreign targets overseas
whose communications flow through American networks. Snowden’s leaked documents suggested a
number of Internet companies that were specifically involved in PRISM: Microsoft, Yahoo, Google,
Facebook, Paltalk, AOL, Skype, YouTube and Apple. See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Prism Program
Taps into User Data of Apple, Google and Others, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data?guni=Article:in%20
body%20link [https://perma.cc/Y6P3-NAGF]; Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection:
Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 757 (2014); Margulies,
supra note 218, at 2139. See generally Niva Elkin-Koren & Eldar Haber, Governance by Proxy:
Cyber Challenges to Civil Liberties, 82 BROOKLYN L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
254. Since January 1, 2016, the right to be delisted has expanded to Russia beyond the
twenty-eight
EU
Member
States
(and
the
four
EFTA
states).
See
Right to Be Forgotten’ Law to Come into Force in Russia on January 1, SPUTNIKNEWS (Jan. 1,
2016), http://sputniknews.com/russia/20160101/1032563709/right-to-be-forgotten-russia-law.html#
ixzz3vyZO01Ix [https://perma.cc/4Y8Y-2MKB].
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solution is needed. Under one hypothesis, if there are other, less
restrictive measures that could be deployed to protect fundamental rights,
then we should consider them first. If such less restrictive measures exist,
then the debate on who should be tasked with acting as the judiciary
could be pragmatically irrelevant.
A. Regulating Behavior
The EU chose to revive data protection under the DPD, and thereby
protect EU citizens and residents online. It is even attempting to
strengthen such protection using the GDPR to create a right to be
forgotten. In other words, the EU chose the law as a modality to regulate
behavior. But the law is not the only modality for regulating behavior.
Lawrence Lessig suggested three modalities (or constraints), other than
law, for regulating behavior: architectural design (code), market, and
social norms.255 Any such modality, with or without the law, could
potentially aid in achieving a right to be delisted.
The first modality (code, or stated more simply, technology) could
aid in solving some of these issues. We can use privacy-by-design (PbD)
to change the default rules for storing information altogether.256 Systems
could allow users to better control their information online by creating
“deletion” buttons. On that ground we could also set expiration dates and
place various restrictions on the use of information.257 We can
technologically (and legally) grant civilians a “reputation bankruptcy”
ability to de-emphasize or entirely delete online information about them
from time to time.258 Yet this approach will mostly solve problems
relating to the data subject’s own data, not third parties, and therefore
would be insufficient.259 Furthermore, such a self-censoring mechanism
is highly problematic in terms of the flow of information online. Can we

255. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 120–37 (2006); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE
CULTURE 11673 (2004). Michael Birnhack suggested that social norms and the market could be
addressed as one because crediting importance to the free market makes it a social value. See
Michael Birnhack, Lex Machina: Information Security and Israeli Computer Act, 4 SHA’AREY
MISHPAT 315, 320 (2006) (Isr.). The benefit of this slight modification of Lessig’s model, is that it
emphasizes the relationships between the modalities.
256. For more on privacy-by-design, see for example ANN CAVOUKIAN & JEFF JONAS,
PRIVACY BY DESIGN IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA (2012).
257. TigerText, for example, offers a service that restricts text-message copying and
forwarding and the ability to control message lifespan. See TIGERTEXT, http://www.tigertext.com
[https://perma.cc/Z2NU-9QCN]. There are similar Apps for social media postings, etc. See Rosen,
supra note 29, at 1535 (describing technological solutions to the right to be forgotten);
MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, supra note 14, at 171–95, 198; Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 72, at 382
(discussing the possibility of expiration dates for personally identifiable data).
258. ZITTRAIN, supra note 19, at 228–29.
259. See Koops, supra note 39, at 243–44.
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really know how long information will be valuable for us or for society
when we set an expiration date?
Another
technological
solution
could
arise
from
260
contextualization.
Under such an approach, data subjects will be
granted the ability to correct online information that is inaccurate, false,
incomplete, out-of-date, or otherwise inappropriate, by providing details
explaining the data.261 Such mechanism, to a great extent, is normatively
opposite to the conception of censorship; instead of delisting results, and
thereby deleting links to content to preserve privacy, search engines and
other websites will contain more information.262 But such a
proposal would not qualify as a proper solution for privacy as viewed in
the EU. To a great extent, it would depend on resources. An individual
with high financial and human resources could manipulate information
online by posting more than the mere individual who does not possess
similar capabilities. Moreover, placing comments near a link to an article
will not necessarily help repair reputation, especially when the reader is
aware of the obvious impartiality of the commentator. And even so, such
mechanism could be abused by third parties who wish to further harm the
data subject either because of some personal connection or because they
are simply Internet trolls.263
The second modality is that of the market. The market’s role in
securing civil rights and liberties could be significant. Consumer
expectations could potentially create negotiable grounds for the usage
and retention of data.264 But more realistically,265 if the law was chosen
to regulate behavior, then the market can raise transparency of both the
removal process and the requests made. Individuals could choose search
engines that provide more transparency than their competitors. Such
transparency could also come from third parties. Third parties could offer
a one-stop shop for filing removal requests with search engines, and such
260. See Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 72, at 384–85 (discussing contextualization as a
solution to the dilemma of perpetual memory).
261. ZITTRAIN, supra note 19, at 229–30; Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 72, at 384.
262. ZITTRAIN, supra note 19, at 229–30.
263. An Internet troll is “an individual who harasses others by posting inflammatory remarks
or images on social media or newsgroups.” Internet Troll, PC MAG, http://www.pcmag.com/
encyclopedia/term/68609/internet-troll [https://perma.cc/SFY8-R9SL].
264. Chris Conley, The Right to Delete, AAAI SPRING SYMPOSIUM: INTELLIGENT
INFORMATION PRIVACY MANAGEMENT 53, 58 (2010) (“If members of society can agree that
individuals deserve the right to own their own digital persona, including records that are held by
third parties, then a right to delete can be established absent any legal change. Private individuals
will find a negotiated means of complying with requests to delete information (assuming that they
even retain information in searchable form), and market actors will adapt to changing consumer
expectations.”).
265. See Koops, supra note 39, at 245 (arguing that “relying on social or economic regulatory
measures is not a feasible proposition”).
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services have indeed begun to emerge.266 These companies could then
publish statistics and information on the outcomes of their requests
(while, probably, removing personally identifiable information (PII)).267
Thus, while search engines might refrain from publishing decisions,
either because of a legal restriction or partially because they fear that
individuals will accumulate knowledge on how to “beat the system,”
external removal services could emerge.268 Nevertheless, transparency of
search engines does not only rely on economic incentives, which could
be effected by the behavior of their consumers, but rather also on
regulation. Generally, if a regulator decides to restrict such transparency,
either by search engines or third parties that provide such transparency
services, then market powers may be too limited to regulate behavior.
But instead of treating the symptoms of the application of the right
to be delisted, like lack of transparency, the market can find other
solutions to solve the problem of the (almost) never-forgetting Internet
without turning to the right to be delisted. One service could be offered
directly by search engines to either remove links upon request and/or
make them practically invisible in a search query. It could be driven by
economic incentives—i.e., that search engines like Google offer removal
of links for a fee—or driven by market forces. For example, if consumers
will only use search engines that offer such removal services for free, the
market will eventually force search engines to comply. The first scenario
is perhaps more plausible than the second, but they both appear fictional.
For such a move by the market, there would have to be a consensus as to
what constitutes online censorship. But these potential mechanisms
would be highly controversial, as they would allow for the censorship of
large swaths of information. From a legal perspective, such
self-censorship could be problematic, as search engines might fear
antitrust and unfair competition laws, which could mandate full
disclosure of the removal process. Mainly, it requires search engines to
act against their business models, which rely on information.
But a market solution could also come from third parties. Even
today, individuals can deploy several self-aid mechanisms to reduce
accessibility to harmful online content. One way, combined with the
modality of code, is to manipulate search results, so that the harmful
results will appear much lower in the search engine’s results. No
technological expertise is needed here, as there are companies that
266. Take for example forget.me, an online service for locating and submitting data requests to
Google and Bing. See FORGET.ME, https://forget.me [https://perma.cc/5YHA-PE99].
267. However, even lacking PIIs, it would be unlikely that most individuals who wish to be
“forgotten” will agree to such policy, and therefore will probably not use their services.
268. See Conley, supra note 264.
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provide this service.269 It is also not implausible to expect that more
technologies for making communication disposable will emerge.270 This
could truly change the way we consume information, but it will still not
be sufficient. It works better for some types of communication that we
would fear falling into the wrong hands. But the Internet is comprised,
and will most likely continue to be comprised, of vast amounts of
information not posted by us, but rather by third parties. This information
will not rely on these technologies, as it is designed to remain on the
Internet.
Finally, we have social norms. Living in an all-knowing society
with unlimited access to information could change opinions of
individuals on search information. Under this argument, a cognitive
adjustment in our view of search results will occur, and individuals will
accept that almost everyone will have negative results when searching
someone’s name.271 The assumption under the social norms modality is
that if society accepts that everyone has a skeleton in his or her closet,
the Internet closet, that is, then information will not negatively impact
anyone’s reputation. If an employer screens a candidate for hiring online
and notices a few embarrassing photos, it would not impact his chances
of getting the job, as “everyone has a few of those.” But while such
cognitive adjustment would be difficult to measure, it will most likely
take time for individuals to make such an adjustment, if they do at all.
Moreover, it will not apply to all individuals. Mr. González, for example,
will likely still wish that his social security debts disappeared from the
Internet.
B. Restraining Judicial Power
Technology, the market, and social norms are limited in achieving
what the EU regulators are trying to achieve. The law, as the last
modality of regulating behavior, was chosen by the EU to regulate the
almost-never-forgetting Internet. But the usage of the law here is
misguided, as it incorporates search engines as part of the judicial
269. For example, reputation.com,
employs advanced techniques and technologies to help push the content you want to see
higher up the search engine pages, whilst effectively pushing the detrimental content
beyond page 1. Typically, people don’t search past page 1 on Google, so by pushing
negative content to subsequent pages, people see a true reflection of your online
reputation.
See Reputation.com, Out with the Old and in with the New, http://uk.reputation.com/suppressmisleading-search-results [https://perma.cc/3AQ9-N88C].
270. See TigerText, supra note 257.
271. For an explanation of such hypothetical cognitive adjustment, see Rustad & Kulevska,
supra note 72, at 385.
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system. That is, if we choose the law to achieve the results of the right to
be delisted, we need to scrutinize the most appropriate method to protect
it.272
The primary normative claim of this Article is that privatization of
the judiciary is highly dangerous for any democratic society. Search
engines should not be placed as judge and jury to decide and balance
between competing fundamental rights. States that wish to protect
individuals against the negative consequences of the Internet should use
regulation, with or without other modalities, in a different manner.
The first suggestion is to completely remove search engines from
any judicial position in the process of delisting or forgetting. Such
decisions should be made only by qualified judicial authorities or a
regulator with judicial capabilities and special expertise,273 not search
engines or any other for-profit commercial entities. The judicial role
should be taken by either current DPAs or state courts. It is also plausible
that states will create new administrative agencies that will be tasked
with the responsibility of dealing with such requests.
The counterargument rests mainly on economic grounds. It will be
highly impractical for such bodies to deal with the large amount of
removal requests274 and, therefore, will not only be impractical, but will
lead to suboptimal protection of privacy and data protection rights. I do
not take such economic considerations lightly. If the state is unable to
deal with such a high volume of requests, then it is not necessarily wise
to place it in a position of safeguarding such rights. What I suggest,
however, is that search engines will be responsible, at least partially, to
fund the operation of such judicial bodies. Generally, I would vote
against a practice in which nongovernmental entities fund operation of
governmental services as it is inherently flawed.275 It is the state which is

272. See Wright, supra note 157, at 404 (suggesting that other legal instruments, e.g., common
law privacy, nondefamation, confidentiality, emotional distress damages rights, and
criminal expungement statutes, jointly provide a better alternative to the right to be forgotten).
273. Heather Greenfield, CCIA’s Response to European Court of Justice Online Privacy
Ruling, CCIA (May 13, 2014), http://www.ccianet.org/2014/05/ccias-response-to-european-court-ofjustice-online-privacy-ruling [https://perma.cc/WHV5-QM7Z] (“[D]ecision about what is and is not
in the public interest should be taken by qualified judges, not private censorship departments, which
this ruling requires.”).
274. Cf. Jonathan Zittrain, Righting the Right to Be Forgotten, FUTURE OF THE INTERNET BLOG
(July 14, 2014), http://blogs.harvard.edu/futureoftheinternet/2014/07/14/righting-the-right-to-beforgotten [https://perma.cc/9ET6-4QWB] (arguing “[i]f Google can process 70,000 requests, so can
and should the data protection authorities”).
275. Funding from the public for state services actually occurs in the United States. In 2015,
the Orleans Public Defenders (OPD) which are Constitutionally-required to provide legal
representation in New Orleans, launched a crowdfunding campaign to raise money. See OPD
Launches Crowdfunding Campaign to Meet Funding Gap, OPD (Sept. 14, 2015),
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tasked with funding such operations. But we can also borrow from the
polluter pays principle in environmental law.276 Search engines
figuratively “pollute” the Internet. They are creating harm, which could
be viewed as an externality, and they should, thereby, internalize the full
social cost of their activity. While they can prevent pollution on their
own (like they do currently), they could also pay someone else to stop or
reduce pollution. Thus, they can fund, partially or fully, the operation of
a governmental agency which handles removal requests.
While this Article supports the implementation of the first
suggestion, which will cease the privatization of the judiciary, the EU is
unlikely to retract from the current application of the right to be delisted.
This Article therefore suggests how the EU, and any other state which
enacts a right to be delisted, should better deal with it by restraining the
judicial powers of search engines.
Restraining the judicial power of search engines under the right to
be delisted should begin with transparency and oversight. Generally, if
search engines remain in the position of judges, then transparency and
oversight are a necessity.277 We must be more informed on the process,
about requests, and about the decisions that search engines make.
Arguably, such transparency will undermine the rationales of the right to
be delisted.278 But such assumption is false. There are many ways of
achieving transparency and still achieving the purpose behind the right to
be delisted.
I begin with a few general recommendations. The delisting process
should be more centralized. There is no necessity, and, in fact, it is
economically inefficient, to have a decentralized removal process, in
which every search engine runs its own services and makes decentralized
decisions. Many of these URLs could appear in more than one search
engine. Therefore, a standardized, online web form could be a proper

http://www.opdla.org/news-and-events/media-coverage/286-opd-launches-crowdfunding-campaignto-meet-funding-gap [https://perma.cc/TL4P-SRTL].
276. For an analysis of such principle, see generally Michael J. Gergen, The Failed Promise of
the “Polluter Pays” Principle: An Economic Analysis of Landowner Liability for Hazardous Waste,
69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624 (1994); Eric Thomas Larson, Why Environmental Liability Regimes in the
United States, the European Community, and Japan Have Grown Synonymous with the Polluter
Pays Principle, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 541 (2005). For an adoption of the polluter pays
principle regarding environmental law in the EU, see Single European Act, 17 Feb. 1986, 1987 O.J.
(L 169) 1.
277. Jan Philipp Albrecht, a leading data protection MEP, stated, “We could be clear in the
regulation that companies cannot just makes these decisions without some sort of independent
oversight.” See Jennifer Baker, Right to Be Forgotten? That’s Not Google’s Call—Data MEP
Albrecht,
REGISTER
(Jan.
7,
2015),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/01/07/
right_to_be_forgotten_not_google_call_data_mep_albrecht [https://perma.cc/BEH6-7XAM].
278. See Letter from Peter Fleischer, supra note 83.
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solution for this problem.279 A step further would be to create a forum in
which search engines can share their knowledge and expertise from the
process. Second, website owners under a removal request should also
play a part in the process. It should be guaranteed that they would have
the opportunity to review requests and potentially dispute claims. Such a
move will increase transparency, reduce the problems of lack of
procedural safeguards, and could shed more light on requests by,
e.g., providing context to the information.
Now for specific recommendations. First, I propose that publishing
decisions with PII could be part of the process. Naturally, that would be
the worst fear of the framers of the right to be delisted. But search
engines could publish the requests with PII for a limited time period,
granting any interested party time to partake in the debate. Under such an
approach, the right to be delisted is more forward looking in the sense
that only limited harm is imposed when such requests will be available
for a short time period before removal. I am aware, however, that such
approach will not only fail to sufficiently advance transparency,280 but
could also undermine the rationale behind the right to be delisted.281 Such
an approach, thus, is not obligatory.
Regulators should next consider allowing the publishing of requests
without PII.282 Webmasters that receive notice from search engines
should have the opportunity to publish the requests that they received,
stripped of PII.283 In that way, we simultaneously notify individuals in
279. Edward Lee offers a solution to few of the problems of the right to be forgotten and
Google’s role in it. He first proposes to create a standardized online web form for individuals to
make one right to be forgotten request. Lee argues that such standardization would reduce the time
and hassle of filing separate requests, provide each claim to a second and third pair of eyes, and
thereby improve the examination of the applications and improve oversight of decisions. See Lee,
supra note 10, at 53–59.
280. Considering the large volumes of removal requests in the EU thus far and the number of
search engines, it would be highly implausible to assert that such limited-time clause will actually be
actionable and, thus, transparency here is highly limited.
281. While publishing the removal requests for a limited time could strike as a good solution
for transparency, it might be proven harmful for the right to be delisted. First, because in many
times, publishing the request made, even for a short while, places focus on the requester and thereby
might lead to the before-mentioned “Streisand effect.” But perhaps mostly, it would enable
third-parties to collect such requests and create a timeless database of all data subjects which could
operate outside the EU.
282. The Working Party addressed the possibility of transparency, and stated that a practice of
providing information to the public regarding delisted links could only be acceptable “if the
information is presented in such a way that users cannot, in any case, conclude that one particular
individual has asked for de-listing of results concerning him or her.” See Working Party, supra note
54, at 3.
283. Such market-based solution has already begun in some websites. For example, Wikimedia
Foundation, which operates Wikipedia, began listing such requests. See Notices Received from
Search
Engines,
WIKIMEDIA
FOUNDATION,
https://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/
Notices_received_from_search_engines [https://perma.cc/658V-3Z98; Tom Goldstein, Somewhat
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society and affected third parties. To address the decentralization
problem, meaning that users cannot be expected to examine all websites
to find out which links were asked to be removed, such an initiative
should be more centralized as it is with the Lumen project.284 However,
this practice, while important, is hardly enough in terms of practicality.
Aside from the notion that such a practice could be viewed as
undermining the rationales behind the right to be delisted, in many
instances it would be fairly easy to understand from the URL which
individual made the request, and it will be almost impossible for third
parties to assess the decisions without information. But in most instances,
the problem will be the converse; it will be almost impossible to examine
such requests without PII and without context. If Mr. González’s request
would have been published without PII and without a link to the article,
we would simply see a notice like: A Spanish national requested Google
Spain to delist results relating to social security debts that were resolved,
and thus outdated and irrelevant. What can we really learn from such a
request and from Google’s decision in this matter? Not much.
A solution could arise, which will safeguard other fundamental
rights, by finding a middle ground between protecting the privacy rights
of individuals and ensuring proper transparency. Such middle ground
could take the form of contextual privacy.285 While it is evident that
publishing the “removed” webpages or the requests for removal, even
without PII, could still endanger privacy, an impartial third party could
play a role in oversight.286 This could take two forms. The first is an
oversight on the judicial process. Under this form of oversight, a third
party will examine all requests made and all decisions by the data
controllers. It could be done in either real time or over time. Such third
party, while exposed to the requests made, is not violating privacy, as it
only views such requests in the context of examining them. It is noted
that such a mechanism is not economically efficient, and such third party
Significant Settlement, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 7, 2005, 8:54 PM), http://web.archive.org/web/
20050208081922/www.scotusblog.com/movabletype,
[https://perma.cc/HYH3-VXL6];
Neil
McIntosh, List of BBC Web Pages Which Have Been Removed from Google’s Search Results, BBC
(June
25,
2015),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/internet/entries/1d765aa8-600b-4f32-b110d02fbf7fd379 [https://perma.cc/M2DJ-7DTD]; see also Geoff Brigham & Michelle Paulson, Wikipedia Pages Censored in European Search Results, WIKIMEDIA BLOG (Aug. 6, 2014),
https://blog.wikimedia.org/2014/08/06/wikipedia-pages-censored-in-european-search-results
[https://perma.cc/6D4H-JJK3]. The BBC, among others, published a list of articles that have been
scrubbed from Internet searches.
284. Lumen, supra note 107.
285. See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND
THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2009).
286. Edward Lee suggests that oversight should be conducted by a newly formed “hybrid
administrative agency.” Such agency will bridge between the decisions of search engines and DPAs
by serving as an appellate body for removal decisions. See Lee, supra note 10, at 53–59.
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should have the judicial role of deciding, but if the EU insists on placing
the judicial role on search engines, then such oversight is crucial. Such
third party will not only serve as an oversight mechanism in specific
cases, but will enable the development of the law. In such review
mechanisms, the third party will be able to make recommendations to the
regulator on how the shape regulations and guidelines. Unlike the first
form, recommendations here are more general, and not individual.
The second form of recommendation relates to the practice of
delisting. Currently in the EU, removal is almost perpetual. When search
engines decide to delist, the content will most likely remain delisted,
unless further action is taken by the website that holds the information. I
suggest that removal should not be perpetual under any circumstances.
Search engines like Google must not only provide mechanisms to delist,
but also a mechanism to relist. While this recommendation is more of a
general criticism on the right to be delisted, and not on specifically the
privatization of the judiciary, it is highly important to emphasize it as the
roles of search engines as judicial bodies enhances this problem. There
are three arguments which support obliging such “relisting” provision.
The first argument relates to unjustified removals. Unjustified
removal is a crucial element for protecting human rights and liberties,
especially when search engines receive large numbers of requests and
could possibly become overinclusive in their decisions. Even with
oversight, mistakes are inevitable. Therefore, any regulator should
necessitate a reversal mechanism, which would allow relisting content.
The second reason relates to the nature of information. What was
once “inadequate” and/or “irrelevant” could change over time.287
Inadequacy is relative term, subject to change by its nature. Irrelevancy
is similar in that sense. Information about an unknown individual could
become highly relevant if she is suddenly running for office. The
opposite could also occur. Once public does not mean always public.288
If a search engine refused to delist results for someone who is currently a
public figure, it does not mean that such individual will not become a
private figure in the future and will thereby gain a right to delist some
links.289
287. Leta Ambrose, supra note 14, at 408 (“Generally, there is no way for researchers to know
what information will be relevant, useful, or valuable until time has passed.”); Zittrain, supra note
274 (“[S]omething that was once relevant could become irrelevant over time . . . .”).
288. See Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, 4 Cal.3d 529, 539 (1971) (“It would be a
crass legal fiction to assert that a matter once public never becomes private again.”).
289. It is debatable whether such scenario is problematic under the right to be delisted. In such
scenario, the previously-public figure—now a private figure—could simply file another removal
request. However, as search engines might use the previous decision to repeat the decision, some
reassurance that decisions are made interdependently are also crucial.
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Third and finally, relisting ensures the integrity of history. If we set
expiration dates on search engines decisions—not data—we reduce the
negative impact on human rights and thereby the power of search
engines to rewrite history. While human rights could still be impacted,
the integrity of history will be reserved.
Such reinsertion process would require changes. It would first
necessitate transparency. Obviously, as noted previously, publishing
information on removal requests is problematic, with or without PII.
Beyond the need for oversight by a third party designated to review
requests, we need an impartial third party to have accessibility to all
requests, at all times. It requires forming a database, hidden from the
public and only viewable for a third party tasked with such mission, to
review decisions and re-review them over time. It could be conceived as
a walled garden of information, meaning that only certain certified
individuals are eligible to enter such garden thereby preserving the right.
Accessibility could be granted to, e.g., academic researchers290 and
human rights organizations. This approach still leaves public
accountability concerns, as these are not public officials, but it could be
viewed as the lesser of two evils by the public.
Any removal process must also contain a misuse provision.
Fraudulent requests for removal should have consequences. Without a
misuse provision, individuals and/or companies might abuse the removal
process. A misuse provision is mostly important when search engines are
acting in a judicial role because their removal process is free and more
accessible than other judiciaries, and is therefore more prone to abuse
and misuse. This misuse provision could prove to be more difficult than
the mechanism for improper takedowns of alleged copyrighted materials
that currently exists under the DMCA. Under the DMCA, the targets of
improper takedowns can file suit against the takedown senders.291 This
DMCA misuse provision was designed to ensure that individuals will
only file a notice-and-takedown request in appropriate cases. Indeed, the
question of copyright infringement is not always clear, especially when
there are various exemptions for copyright infringement like fair use,292
which could make a supposedly valid claim of infringement erroneous.
Nonetheless, this test is mostly objective and not similar to the right to be
delisted. Whether the content in question is inadequate, irrelevant, or
290. Zittrain, supra note 274 (suggesting to form a database of takedowns that independent
academics can analyze).
291. 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2012).
292. U.S. copyright law provides a “fair use” exemption to copyright infringement for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, and research. See id. § 107.
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excessive in relation to those purposes and in the light of the time that
has elapsed is subjective and opened to a much broader interpretation.
But such misuse provision could still be used against individuals
where it is clear that their claims were intentionally deceptive. It is
plausible to codify a misuse provision in the application of the right to be
delisted, to ensure that search engines, the content holder whose link was
removed, or even third parties, could take legal action against the
individual who requested the removal. But it all goes back to the need of
transparency.
The final recommendation is more general to the right to be delisted
and refers to procedural safeguards and the process of appeal. Like any
court decision, the search engine ruling on a removal request should be
subject to appeal. Currently in the EU, the right of appeal is reserved for
the data subject who, upon rejection of her request, can ask the local data
protection authority, or the relevant judicial authority, to review the
search engine’s decision.293 The problem with this appeal system is
twofold. First, it seems from practice that it does not work very well.294
While people exercise their right through search engines, they are less
inclined to do so through DPAs because they are either unaware that
such DPAs exist295 or unaware that they possess a right to appeal.296 The
second aspect is related to the parties that are not part of the judicial
process. The webmaster and other individuals in society do not receive
an appeal right. While webmasters sometimes receive notice of
removals,297 and such notice is not only optional but also perhaps even
illegal,298 their “appeal” is limited to asking the search engine to
reconsider its decision. Other individuals in society do not receive any
right of appeal.
293. Any formal claims should be envisaged by Article 28(4) of the Directive and treated by
DPAs under their national legislation in the same manner as all other claims for mediation. See
Working Party, supra note 54, at 11.
294. See supra note 138.
295. A survey conducted in the UK in May 2015, suggested that only 1% of public have heard
of the UK data protection authority (the Information Commissioner’s Office). See DataIQ News,
ICO Admits Awareness Failings as Only 1% of Public Have Heard of It, DATAIQ (May 19, 2015),
http://www.dataiq.co.uk/news/201505/ico-admits-awareness-failings-only-1-public-have-heard-it
[https://perma.cc/38WS-J5VR].
296. Joe McNamee, of the non-profit digital rights lobby group EDRi, suggested that it is
plausible that Europeans do not even know they have the right to complain to their DPA. See Peter
Teffer, Google Should ‘Inform More’ on Right to Be Forgotten, EUOBSERVER (Oct. 12, 2015),
https://euobserver.com/digital/130645 [https://perma.cc/ZKF8-W398]. However, it should be noted
that upon rejection of a removal request, Google informs the requester of his or her right to bring the
matter before the competent data protection authority. See Letter from Peter Fleischer, supra note
83, at 5.
297. See supra note 223.
298. See supra note 225.
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Therefore, we need to form a more appropriate appeal mechanism
for search engines decisions. If we embrace the walled garden of
information approach, then these third party examiners will possess the
right to file an appeal on behalf of both the third affected party and for
the benefit of society. But unfortunately, due to the difficulties of the
right to be delisted, in terms of its vagueness and information gaps from
its ex-parte nature, such appeal is insufficient as a legal safeguard. While
it is still a better practice than currently deployed in the EU, it should not
be considered sufficient to protect fundamental rights.
While this Article suggests few methods to better implement a right
to be delisted, all in all, it warns against granting judicial power to search
engines. They are part of the problem, and could also be part of the
solution, but not as a judiciary. Judicial roles should remain in the realm
of the state, even if it is less economically efficient. It is crucial for any
democratic society that the rule of law will be safeguarded from potential
abuse. It is crucial that fundamental rights be protected by the state and
not by for-profit organizations. Such a judicial role blurs the distinctions
between private and public—the roles of the state, and those of
companies.
CONCLUSION
The e-memory revolution presents new challenges for society.
Information could not only become perpetual but also highly accessible
through search engines. While individuals may evaluate the right to
privacy in different manners, it should be evident that this revolution
may require a new evaluation of digital technology’s risks. The European
Union’s current right to be delisted and right to be forgotten do exactly
that, but they do it poorly. They place a form of censorship on the
Internet, while endangering freedom speech, freedom of information, and
freedom of the press. They are impractical to a great extent, and they
present many challenges for search engines and regulators.
But the main problem with those rights is normatively broader.
They represent a dangerous path that modern societies have taken
towards the privatization of the judiciary. What began as a quasi-judicial
role for search engines under a notice-and-takedown regime of alleged
copyright infringement takes a step-up under the EU’s new rights
enforcement regime. This new form of privatization is truly unique in
modern society. Unlike other forms of judiciary privatizations, this
judiciary is tasked with safeguarding only certain fundamental rights. It
shifts decisions about these fundamental rights from the public sphere.
Not only is such privatization unique in the sense of the type of rights
that it handles, but it also almost entirely removes democratic safeguards
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like oversight and transparency. When search engines like Google reach
a decision, there are only a handful of cases, out of millions of URLs,
that the state will reexamine under an appeal process. Rule of law does
not apply here, nor do any procedural safeguards.
This Article argues that such privatization should not occur. While
economic considerations could suggest otherwise, there is no room for
privatizing the judiciary when dealing with fundamental rights. Public
officials should be handling such requests, not search engines. If the EU
insists on using search engines as a judiciary, they must also restrain
their judicial power and provide adequate safeguards for society. In any
such mechanism, policymakers must ensure proper transparency and
oversight on search engines’ removal procedure and decisions.
The implications of privatization of the judiciary extend far beyond
the EU. They represent how states are coping with the threats that the
digital era brings. Perhaps the roles of intermediaries online are
changing, which may necessitate a reframing of their legal duties and
responsibilities. By the same token, the threats that the digital era brings
may also necessitate a reframing of the roles of the state and governance
in this new digital era. What the digital era should not change is the
protection of fundamental rights under the rule of law. If it does, the
concept of democracy might also be forgotten.

